Esssay
Commentaries
Why Should We Be Concerned About Biological Warfare?
There is a widespread tendency to think about defense against biological warfare as unnecessary, as someone else’s responsibility, or as simply too difficult. Unfortunately, however, the dangers posed by biological weapons did not disappear when the United States began to unilaterally dismantle its own offensive program in 1969. The dangers did not vanish with the signing of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972, and they did not dissipate with the end of the Cold War or the threat of nuclear retaliation against Iraq during the Persian Gulf conflict. Only by planning and investing in the right training and defensive measures can we diminish the likelihood that biological weapons will be used and reduce the risks, disruption, and casualties in the event that such weapons are used.1 Fortunately, significant improvements can be made in our defensive posture at relatively modest levels of investment, and both the Department of Defense and the medical community can play a substantial role in this regard. Biological weapons are unfortunately characterized by low visibility, high potency, substantial accessibility, and relatively easy delivery. The basic facts are well known: a millionth of a gram of anthrax constitutes a lethal inhalation dose. A kilogram, depending on meteorological conditions and means of delivery, has the potential to kill hundreds of thousands of people in a metropolitan area. These small quantities make the concealment, transportation, and dissemination of biological agents relatively easy. Many of these agents—bacteria, viruses, and toxins—occur naturally in the environment. Moreover, many are used for wholly legitimate medical purposes (such as the development of antibiotics and vaccines), and much of the technology required to produce and “weaponize†them is available for civilian or military use. Unlike nuclear weapons, missiles or other advanced systems
Why Should We Be Concerned About Biological Warfare?
There is a widespread tendency to think about defense against biological warfare as unnecessary, as someone else’s responsibility, or as simply too difficult. Unfortunately, however, the dangers posed by biological weapons did not disappear when the United States began to unilaterally dismantle its own offensive program in 1969. The dangers did not vanish with the signing of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972, and they did not dissipate with the end of the Cold War or the threat of nuclear retaliation against Iraq during the Persian Gulf conflict. Only by planning and investing in the right training and defensive measures can we diminish the likelihood that biological weapons will be used and reduce the risks, disruption, and casualties in the event that such weapons are used.1 Fortunately, significant improvements can be made in our defensive posture at relatively modest levels of investment, and both the Department of Defense and the medical community can play a substantial role in this regard. Biological weapons are unfortunately characterized by low visibility, high potency, substantial accessibility, and relatively easy delivery. The basic facts are well known: a millionth of a gram of anthrax constitutes a lethal inhalation dose. A kilogram, depending on meteorological conditions and means of delivery, has the potential to kill hundreds of thousands of people in a metropolitan area. These small quantities make the concealment, transportation, and dissemination of biological agents relatively easy. Many of these agents—bacteria, viruses, and toxins—occur naturally in the environment. Moreover, many are used for wholly legitimate medical purposes (such as the development of antibiotics and vaccines), and much of the technology required to produce and “weaponize†them is available for civilian or military use. Unlike nuclear weapons, missiles or other advanced systems
References: 1. Danzig R. Biological warfare: a nation at risk—a time to act. Strategic Forum [serial online]. January 1996. 2. Christopher GN, Cieslak TJ, Pavlin JA, Eitzen EM Jr. Biological warfare: a historical perspective. JAMA. 1997;278:412-417. 3. Vick K. Plea bargain rejected in bubonic plague case. Washington Post. April 3, 1996:A8. 4. Morganthau T. A shadow over the Olympics. Newsweek. May 6, 1996:34. 5. Olson KB. Biological weapons and the terror in Japan. Terrorism. August 1997;1:1. 6. Beyerchen AD. From radio to radar: interwar military adaptation to technological change in Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In: Williamson M, Millett AR, eds. Military Innovation in the Interwar Period. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press; 1996:265-299. 7. Zilinskas R. Iraq’s biological weapons: the past as future? JAMA. 1997;278: 418-424. 8. Tucker JB. National health and medical services response to incidents of chemical and biological terrorism. JAMA. 1997;278:362-368. 9. Horrock N. The new terror fear: biological weapons: detecting an attack is just the first problem. US News & World Report. May 12, 1997:36. 432 JAMA, August 6, 1997—Vol 278, No. 5 Commentaries ©1997 American Medical Association. All rights reserved.