American Naval Strategy Summary

Mahan’s intent is extremely conspicuous and he offers little qualification about his desire to increase the size and relevance the US Navy to achieve the interests of the state; however his theories are largely insufficient when examining a large amount of technological, geographic, and strategic factors. In his words, “Naval strategy has indeed for its end to found, support, and increase, as well in peace as in war, the sea power of a country.” He offers no scientific validity to his assumptions and prepositions, only that history has shown with clarity in specific circumstances that naval power has been decisive to achieve the ends of the state. Mahan saw limited utility in naval bombardment, amphibious operations, or operations other
Everett Dolman proffers a pragmatic theory about strategy; his viewpoint is that strategy is “an unending process that can never lead to conclusion… continuation is the goal of strategy—not culmination.” He defines strategy as “a plan for attaining continuing advantage.” Examination of “victory” in a temporary sense is revolutionary with respect to theory, especially military theory, and his tenet of continuing advantage as the ultimate goal of strategy shifts the standard paradigm of Clausewitz, Mahan, and Douhet amongst many other interim theorists. Strategy does not end upon the surrender of the enemy, and in many cases the most difficult areas of strategy commence. Dolman goes as far to say a significant military victory can still have very little impact when considered with the “diplomatic, socio-cultural, economic, and information realms.” His incorporation of multiple instruments of power into “pure strategy” is an illuminating strength benefitting any strategist formulating a plan for strategic effect. In this manner, “strategists seek to increase available options by manipulating structure and context.” Dolman analyzes Clausewitz’s maxims heavily and concludes the unique nature of each conflict requires modifications of theory to achieve strategic effects in the present to shape continuing advantage for the
If a strategist is artificially constrained (maximum boots on the ground, no ground troops, withdrawal in six months, etc) a strategist must either amend those constraints or seek theories that enable her to maximize her utility in that context. In this perspective, Clausewitz’s theory of genius will always be salient. It is imperative that a strategist is able to incorporate multiple perspectives and develop the best solution for the context provided. For this reason, the relationship between strategy and theory could be anything from nothing at all to everything. It depends upon the strategist and the ability for him to exercise judgment when creating a strategy to manage context for continuing