Clausewitz's Theory Of War

Continuing relevance of Clausewitz in understanding nature and character of warfare in 21st century
While many scholars attempted to theorize war in human history, only few were credited for constructing consistent theories on which people could base and further their understanding of war and warfare. Those include Greek Thucydides, Chinese Sun Tzu, and Indian Kautilya all three from 3-4th century BC; Prussian Carl von Clausewitz and Swiss Antoine-Henry Jomini both from 19th century. All of those prominent theorist had a lot to offer and therefore had great influence on our thinking in war, warfare, and strategy. However, Clausewitz’s theory offers more insight if one carefully and purposely studied the “paradoxical trinity” identified in his
Unsurprisingly, this statement generates criticism on applicability of Clausewitz’s theory with the increase of intra-state wars since the end of Cold War. For instance, H.P Willmott and Michael B. Barrett argued that Clausewitz’s theory is overly simplistic, and according to the Prussian, war has only one simple nature which is its subordination to policy and the theory lost its legacy as a result of absence of inter-state war since the first Gulf War. At first glance it might seem that war is inherently subservient to a government as it usually generates politics and directs policies. However, governments are not only policy makers and wage wars on another yet emergence of non-state actors brought change in the current security environment. In fact, Clausewitz had an answer to his critics if one read his book carefully. Essentially he said that “…..the feudal lords and trading cities of the Middle Ages, eighteenth-century kings and the rulers and peoples of the nineteenth century - all conducted war in their own particular way, using different methods and pursuing different aims”. It is therefore fair to assume that he was aware of other actors who would have different aims/policies than those of states. With regard to the ISIS, its main aim is to create Islamic caliphate and its actions against Iraqi and Syria governments, and against the West are continuation of its policies. Therefore, it is fair to say that Clausewitz’s hypothesis on war’s subordination to policy is still applicable while policy itself, in other word, war’s one of characters changing over time. War has been and would be always continuation of policy yet policy makers would decide to provoke it under their assumption of chance to succeed as