Summary Of On The Intellect By Al-Kindi

The 9th century Islamic philosopher Al-Kindi is largely acknowledged as having a major role in the translation and introduction of Greek philosophical thought into the Islamic world. In his work On the Intellect, Al-Kindi gives a very brief exposition and interpretation of Aristotle’s theories of Intellect as presented in De Anima. In this short exposition, Al-Kindi presents several metaphysical quandaries which I, an utterly confused and overwhelmed freshman, will attempt to interpret and critically analyze; bear with me. In an effort to fully understand this short text, each section of Al-Kindi’s On the Intellect will be analyzed individually. In the first section, Al-Kindi begins On the Intellect with a short blessing before diving into
Al-Kindi states that, “When the soul has the use of [the form], it is in the soul, but the soul has use of it only because it is in the soul in potentiality.” (McGinnis and Reisman 16, §3). The form here is Aristotle’s concept of form i.e. the perfect concept of a thing; when the soul comprehends that perfect form, according to Al-Kindi, the form exists in the soul—though the soul only has use of the form because that form existed already as a potential in the soul. In simpler terms, an idea can exist in a mind only because that idea exists as a potential thought in the mind. Al-Kindi goes on to clarify that this form is not literally in the soul, as the soul is incorporeal and therefore cannot contain a thing. He expounds then that, since the soul cannot contain a thing, the “faculty of sense” is not something that exists outside of the soul; the ability to sense is a facet or ability of the soul—the mind is what senses (McGinnis and Reisman 16, §3). From there he states, “. . .what is sensed in the soul is what senses,” in this case “what is sensed” refers to the form that is thought into the soul—therefore the knowledge of form in the soul is what causes thought to spring into the mind (McGinnis and Reisman 16,
Anything that receives something must, in Al-Kindi’s epistemological theory, previously have that bestowed property or concept in potentiality. He expounds that all things that possess a potential are unable to bring those potentials into actuality without having been bestowed those actualities by a cause that contains those actualities, if they could actualize potential without outside cause, then all things would become actual as that actuality would have to exist in them. As the first intellect is the only thing in which all other things are actual it follows that all potentials are actualized by the first intellect. Here begins Al-Kindi’s relation of Aristotle’s concepts to Islam, it is likely that Al-Kindi interprets the first intellect as being God and therefore all things come from God as the first cause. To me, this is where Al-Kindi’s premise begins to fall apart—though that will be discussed after each section is analyzed