Sorites Paradox
2014190046 – DaYe Shin
Professor Colin Caret
World Philosophy (UIC1901-03)
October 31th 2014
Vagueness: The Sorites Paradox and Supervaluationism Vagueness is common and pervasive in our everyday use of language. Being bald, tall or red are all vague concepts which are used without being detected as such. Vagueness is caused by “borderline cases”, cases in which “we do not know what to say, despite having all the information that would normally fix the correct verdict” (Paradoxes, p.41). To illustrate, it is not stipulated as to which boundary a person should be lacking in hair in order to be described as “bald.” If people with varying numbers of hair were to line up, one could not possibly designate a person to be the criterion for differentiating …show more content…
Thus, vagueness has been a popular subject among scholars upon which elaborate theories and ideas were developed. In this paper, subsequent to describing the Sorites paradox, a …show more content…
To clarify, vagueness occurs because the language fails to cover all the cases to which a concept might apply. Hence, supervaluationists assert that each and every case of a concept should be subjected to a series of “sharpening” or “precisification,” a function which fills in the undetermined gaps within the concept. Symbolizing a sharpening as S, if an object is definitely Y, based on actual use, it must satisfy S(Y). If it is definitely not Y, then it must not satisfy S(Y). S(Y) must decide for every case whether or not it satisfies the concept. According to the logic, a sentence is super-true if and only if it is true on every sharpening, and false vice versa. Borderline cases, however, could be decided differently on different sharpenings. In such cases, the sentence is “neither true nor false.” The statement that “a person with absolutely no hair is bald” is super-true, whereas a person with n hairs could be bald or not depending on whether a sharpening larger than the number n is applied. In this regard, the premise of the sorites paradox that “if n-grained collection of sand is a heap, then so is n-l grained collection” does not hold because it could be true on one sharpening but false on another. Intriguingly, supervaluationism rejects the principle of bivalence, the dichotomy between truth and falsity, allowing for the intermediate
Professor Colin Caret
World Philosophy (UIC1901-03)
October 31th 2014
Vagueness: The Sorites Paradox and Supervaluationism Vagueness is common and pervasive in our everyday use of language. Being bald, tall or red are all vague concepts which are used without being detected as such. Vagueness is caused by “borderline cases”, cases in which “we do not know what to say, despite having all the information that would normally fix the correct verdict” (Paradoxes, p.41). To illustrate, it is not stipulated as to which boundary a person should be lacking in hair in order to be described as “bald.” If people with varying numbers of hair were to line up, one could not possibly designate a person to be the criterion for differentiating …show more content…
Thus, vagueness has been a popular subject among scholars upon which elaborate theories and ideas were developed. In this paper, subsequent to describing the Sorites paradox, a …show more content…
To clarify, vagueness occurs because the language fails to cover all the cases to which a concept might apply. Hence, supervaluationists assert that each and every case of a concept should be subjected to a series of “sharpening” or “precisification,” a function which fills in the undetermined gaps within the concept. Symbolizing a sharpening as S, if an object is definitely Y, based on actual use, it must satisfy S(Y). If it is definitely not Y, then it must not satisfy S(Y). S(Y) must decide for every case whether or not it satisfies the concept. According to the logic, a sentence is super-true if and only if it is true on every sharpening, and false vice versa. Borderline cases, however, could be decided differently on different sharpenings. In such cases, the sentence is “neither true nor false.” The statement that “a person with absolutely no hair is bald” is super-true, whereas a person with n hairs could be bald or not depending on whether a sharpening larger than the number n is applied. In this regard, the premise of the sorites paradox that “if n-grained collection of sand is a heap, then so is n-l grained collection” does not hold because it could be true on one sharpening but false on another. Intriguingly, supervaluationism rejects the principle of bivalence, the dichotomy between truth and falsity, allowing for the intermediate