Outline How The ACIRC Should Augment The ASF Gaps?

Additionally, the ASF force structure consists of light infantry battalions with no force multipliers. For instance, Special Forces to augment the infantry units are not part of the ASF structure. As a result, they lack the capability to carry out a peacekeeping mission in scenario five and six. Third, it will be difficult to achieve the ASF deployment timelines (shown in table 1) stated in the framework due to lack of strategic airlift. Therefore, to deploy and sustain the force, the AU will seek support from other countries or charter private flights. Currently, the ASF depends largely on external support mainly from the European Union (EU), the United States of America (USA), and other countries through direct support to the AU or to the RECs/RMs.
Furthermore, the AU and RECs/RMs still face the challenge of regional logistics hub bases that were supposed to be established but have not yet been completed. Logistical bases would ensure pre-positioned material is present in each region to facilitate the rapid and effective deployment of troops, and sustain the force.
The ACIRC should augment the ASF to fill ASF gaps. The AU should streamline how the ACIRC could augment the ASF in addressing the incapability issue the ASF lacks, because the ACIRC is well equipped, and it has tactical battle groups and force multipliers such as Special Forces. Again, the ASF should review its force organization structure to meet capability needs. Fifth, the deployment of force without the AU authorization by ECOWAS in Gambia illustrates the necessity to have clear procedures between the AU and REC/RMs on mandating and authorizing authority. The AU should review the relationship between UNSC and AU PSC as stated in the UN Charter, Chapter VIII. The AU and RECs/RMs should improve consensus and coordination. Sixth, the AU should expedite progress of continental