Raphael Lemkin Trial

“Consider the case of a farmer who owns a flock of chickens. He kills them and this is his business. If you interfere, you are trespassing.” Raphael Lemkin, an impressionable philology scholar at the University of Lvov discovered that the cardinal sin of violating state sovereignty could be used to safeguard those who attempted to exterminate minorities. After learning this, he studied and lectured international law. Lemkin postulated the tendency of history to repeat itself, regardless of context, and realized that states seldom pursue justice out of moral convictions, but do so merely in self-interest. If such atrocities were to be prevented, it would take a joint effort on part of the international community. Lemkin searched for a term
The ambiguity of the definition has led to abundant dispute over whether particular events constitute “genocide,” hindering the effectiveness of the convention. Thus, rather than focusing on prevention and punishment, the two main tenets of the convention, there has instead been much dispute over whether particular events constitute “genocide,” hindering the effectiveness of the Convention. The traditionally accepted definition demands specific intent. The main difficulty in dealing with this specific intent is obtaining irrefutable proof that the perpetrator intended to destroy the group, in whole or in part. The issue lies in confusion between motive and intent. Motive refers to what drives the perpetrator to commit their crime, why they did it, and proof of this is not required for conviction. Conversely, if perpetrators intend to commit prohibited acts and kill a substantial part of the group, they are committing genocide. A number of contemporary conflicts, including Cambodia and the former Yugoslavia, are exemplary of situations wherein no paper trail led to specific intent being inferred from the cumulative effect of objective conduct. Even, “U.N. officials in the former Yugoslavia resisted publicizing atrocity reports.” (Power, 403) Perpetrators are acutely aware that disclosing their actions would interfere with achieving their objectives. Thus, if
The U.N. Commission’s report on Darfur would set the stage for the “genocide” deliberation. The events found in the report indisputably prove acts of genocide. However, according to Alex de Waal, “ The question of intent is somewhat more ambiguous. There is no demonstrated intent to eliminate physically an entire ethnic group, and—with the exception of the Nuba in 1992-1993—no attempt to wholly eliminate the identity of a group. Both the stated and the real aim has been to subjugate.” Though de Waal clearly did not understand that genocide could be committed against a group in part, his discussion of the confusion over intent is vital. As such, the issue of intent in the convention has allowed the Sudanese governments, as well as numerous others, to evade justice by justifying their actions in the context of military and political threats as counter-insurgency. (de Waal, 28) However, Darfur set an important precedent when the Secretary of State Colin Powell deemed it genocide and sent abundant humanitarian aid, but then noted that U.S. policy would not change. If the duty to intervene was placed on specific countries, such as those of the Security Council, who are able to intervene, this conflict could be avoided altogether. Moreover, even U.N. agencies have been highly effective in providing humanitarian aid, yet absent in action.