Mortiz Schlick: the Meaning of Life in Play
Final Essay
Schlick and the meaning of life in play
Philosophy: The Meaning of Life I do not agree with Schlick's contention that the meaning of life is grounded in the act of play and not work. I disagree for three main reasons. First, I find Schlicks account of forgetting the purpose of activities to be somewhat flawed. He demonstrates how the purpose of an activity does not yield meaning and that work is a means to a goal. I find a discrepancy in this in regards to his acceptance of Goethe's rule. Schlick also holds that in order for us to understand how to lead a meaningful life through creative-play, that we do it by emulating children or youth. I disagree with Schlicks supposed template for meaningfulness due to the feelings associated with creative-play and what it is to feel meaning in something. I argue that he is appealing to emotions rather than the quality of meaning. Finally, I discuss Schlicks understanding of youth and what it means to attempt to emulate it. I believe that he is too presumptuous and assumes that all youth is experienced in a similar manner; this is not the case each individual possesses a different aspect of what youthful living is and was.
Schlick holds that creative play may produce valuable goods in the same way that unpleasurable activity or work can. He then goes on to say that the more activities become play, the more work would be accomplished and value would arise from it. He finishes by saying that work is human action because we think of the outcomes or benefits, and not because we arrive at them. He uses examples such as the artist using the act of creation as a means of forgetting the rewards of the project he toils away at. I disagree with Schlick, or his understanding of forgetting the fruits beared from the act of creative play. In this sense, Schlick is assuming that we cannot have a goal in mind in order to derive meaning from the moment. He stresses that purposeless activities are the key to deriving
Schlick and the meaning of life in play
Philosophy: The Meaning of Life I do not agree with Schlick's contention that the meaning of life is grounded in the act of play and not work. I disagree for three main reasons. First, I find Schlicks account of forgetting the purpose of activities to be somewhat flawed. He demonstrates how the purpose of an activity does not yield meaning and that work is a means to a goal. I find a discrepancy in this in regards to his acceptance of Goethe's rule. Schlick also holds that in order for us to understand how to lead a meaningful life through creative-play, that we do it by emulating children or youth. I disagree with Schlicks supposed template for meaningfulness due to the feelings associated with creative-play and what it is to feel meaning in something. I argue that he is appealing to emotions rather than the quality of meaning. Finally, I discuss Schlicks understanding of youth and what it means to attempt to emulate it. I believe that he is too presumptuous and assumes that all youth is experienced in a similar manner; this is not the case each individual possesses a different aspect of what youthful living is and was.
Schlick holds that creative play may produce valuable goods in the same way that unpleasurable activity or work can. He then goes on to say that the more activities become play, the more work would be accomplished and value would arise from it. He finishes by saying that work is human action because we think of the outcomes or benefits, and not because we arrive at them. He uses examples such as the artist using the act of creation as a means of forgetting the rewards of the project he toils away at. I disagree with Schlick, or his understanding of forgetting the fruits beared from the act of creative play. In this sense, Schlick is assuming that we cannot have a goal in mind in order to derive meaning from the moment. He stresses that purposeless activities are the key to deriving
References: Klemke and Schlick. On the meaning of life. New York, NY: Oxford University Press Inc., 2008.