Threat Assessment

This week’s reading and notes demonstrate the complexity involved with determining whether or not a terrorist group is likely to obtain and employ a CBRN weapon and where it would most likely be used if it was procured. The prospects for a group such as Al-Qaeda or other non-state actor to obtain and use a CBRN weapon are relatively low both within the United States and abroad, however the threat is not non-existent. As noted by Sinai (2007), there are four major security issues including the terrorist groups themselves, weapon proliferation/acquisition by these groups, safe havens in weak, failed, and/or failing states, and permissive conditions in strong nations (Para 8). If one is to look at conditions in countries such as Yemen and others like it, the failed/failing state lacks any legitimate government which not only creates a power vacuum that unsavory actors seek to fill, but also lacks the capacity to effectively deter terror activities. Compounding the problem with permissive conditions for
In one of the classes I teach to our military personnel, threat assessment is one of the topics and in the simplest terms it boils down to three considerations: first, what does the enemy want to do to us? Second, what can the enemy do to us? This is distinctly different from the first consideration as intent and capability are often vastly different. The last factor is where is the action most likely to be taken against us? If we compile these three items into one coherent product, a reasonably accurate threat assessment can be produced. After a threat assessment is done, we should consider the consequences of a successful CBRN attack and train not always for the worst case, but for the most likely scenario that will play out (Mauroni, 2010, p