The moral legitimacy of states and the limits of sovereignty
1. Introduction
According to Slocombe (2003, p.117) there is no question that has more preoccupied the discussion of international relations than that of the legitimacy and wisdom of the use of force. Sincere efforts to substitute international institution and diplomacy for military power, the costs of multiple terrible wars, and even the potential consequences of war fought with nuclear weapons did not change the fact that threat and use of force are still the ultimate ‘last arguments’ of international relations. One very compelling aspect of the use of force within international relations is the concept of ‘humanitarian intervention’. …show more content…
When Walzer (1980) claims that a loss of internal legitimacy is not a reason for outsiders to intervene I absolutely agree with him, but when he implicitly argues that in case of tyranny or anarchy humanitarian intervention also should not be morally permissible cannot agree. It seems to me like he argues that dictators come from society itself, like they come naturally. This basically comes down to the fact that the society is responsible there self for the injustice they suffer. Unless there is Genocide, enslavement or mass deportation there is a fit between government and the people. The best argument against this is from Luban (1980, p. 392). I quote: “The government fits the people the way the sole of a boot fits a human face: after a while the patterns of indentation fit with uncanny …show more content…
Can a liberal government justify to its own citizens when it intervenes on humanitarian grounds? And if so, how can they do this? I think this is a very relevant question. An often-heard ‘liberal’ argument against humanitarian intervention is that the state is just a tool for advancing the citizens’ interest and will, so in that case the government does not have the authority to engage the collective resources of the state in a humanitarian intervention because it does not owe any duties to foreigners (Buchanan, 1999). I reject this argument on the ground of a natural duty to contribute to the inclusion of all persons to live in justice. I think you should not see it as proper action of a state to pay no attention to oppression elsewhere, instead I think that states should be seen as instruments of justice, and should be used to promote and secure human rights, also human rights in other societies as long as this is done at a reasonable cost. This should also be the case for means of military humanitarian