The many doctrines of promissory estoppel
If one concept in the early part of the contract law syllabus is difficult for the law student to digest, it is promissory estoppel, usually learned alongside the doctrine of consideration. This article tackles this tricky topic by dissecting promissory estoppel. by Adam Kramer, Lecturer in Law, University of Durham
Promises are special in our society because there is a societal or moral convention that allows a promisor to be treated as bound to his promise (promises here including behaviour making others believe that one has promised, as well as the more obvious overt statements such as ‘I promise …’). The law of England and Wales reflects this moral convention by enforcing promises that are given in exchange for other promises or consideration, ordering the promisor to perform or to pay expectation damages. As we all know, such legally binding promises are called ‘contracts’. Once a contract has successfully been formed, it cannot be varied without a further promise given in exchange for another promise or some consideration. In other words, the doctrine of consideration applies to variation as well as to the formation of contracts – if two parties want to vary the contract by increasing or decreasing only one party’s obligations, that variation will only be binding if consideration is given by the benefited party. Just because there is a moral rule that makes promises binding, this does not mean that there are not other (perhaps less stringent) moral rules governing promises, agreements and statements. Think about a professional carelessly valuing my property: the valuation statement will usually be actionable both as breach of a contractual undertaking and as a commission of the tort of negligence, counting both as a breach of a binding promise and as a wrongful interference in my life through my reliance upon the statement’s accuracy. It will be shown that the various forms of estoppel are like the