wto and vietnam
Do WTO Rules Create a Level Playing
Field? Lessons from the Experience of Peru and Vietnam∗
Christina L. Davis
Department of Politics
Princeton University†
∗
The author thanks Marc Busch, Thomas Cottier, Judith Goldstein, Eduardo Perez Motta, and John
Odell for comments on the paper, and thanks Anbinh Phan and Courtenay Dunn for valuable research assistance. The research benefited greatly from interviews with officials involved in the negotiations, who have not been cited by name at their request.
†
Assistant Professor, Department of Politics and Woodrow Wilson School of International Affairs,
Princeton University. Send comments to cldavis@princeton.edu.
Introduction
Realist scholars of international relations and the NGO groups protesting on the streets of
Seattle in 1999 share a common assumption. Both believe that less developed countries are at a disadvantage when negotiating with more powerful counterparts. Smaller market size makes it ineffective for developing countries to use threats of retaliation in order to combat discrimination against their goods. In contrast, retaliation measures taken by larger economies can easily cause severe damage to a smaller economy. This leaves developing countries vulnerable to discriminatory trade policies adopted by their major trade partners.
In spite of their apparent lack of bargaining leverage, however, in some negotiations developing countries have been able to achieve positive outcomes – even the overturn of protectionist measures against their exports by the United States and EU. Simply evaluating the relative market power of the two sides in an economic negotiation is inadequate.
As Odell (2000) argues, the strategies used in the negotiation process matter as much as the material resources of each participant. In addition, the institutional context of the negotiation can generate pressure for liberalization (Davis, 2003). For trade negotiations, the institutional context is shaped
Field? Lessons from the Experience of Peru and Vietnam∗
Christina L. Davis
Department of Politics
Princeton University†
∗
The author thanks Marc Busch, Thomas Cottier, Judith Goldstein, Eduardo Perez Motta, and John
Odell for comments on the paper, and thanks Anbinh Phan and Courtenay Dunn for valuable research assistance. The research benefited greatly from interviews with officials involved in the negotiations, who have not been cited by name at their request.
†
Assistant Professor, Department of Politics and Woodrow Wilson School of International Affairs,
Princeton University. Send comments to cldavis@princeton.edu.
Introduction
Realist scholars of international relations and the NGO groups protesting on the streets of
Seattle in 1999 share a common assumption. Both believe that less developed countries are at a disadvantage when negotiating with more powerful counterparts. Smaller market size makes it ineffective for developing countries to use threats of retaliation in order to combat discrimination against their goods. In contrast, retaliation measures taken by larger economies can easily cause severe damage to a smaller economy. This leaves developing countries vulnerable to discriminatory trade policies adopted by their major trade partners.
In spite of their apparent lack of bargaining leverage, however, in some negotiations developing countries have been able to achieve positive outcomes – even the overturn of protectionist measures against their exports by the United States and EU. Simply evaluating the relative market power of the two sides in an economic negotiation is inadequate.
As Odell (2000) argues, the strategies used in the negotiation process matter as much as the material resources of each participant. In addition, the institutional context of the negotiation can generate pressure for liberalization (Davis, 2003). For trade negotiations, the institutional context is shaped
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