Why Should Finland Join NATO?

The question of whether Finland should join NATO has lain relatively dormant for the majority of the time since the end of the Cold War. While a discussion occasionally flared up in public, official political circles seemed to not give the option serious consideration – Finland has a tradition of neutrality in that regard that there was no point in breaking. However, the crisis in Ukraine has not only brought the question to the fore in Finland again, it has also led to a repeated suggestion for Ukraine's further course of action: Copy Finland's model. At first sight, it is a suggestion that makes a lot of sense: Finland has not known any violent altercations with Russia since World War II; in fact, the relationship between the two countries appears comparatively positive judging from sectors such as the extent of mutual trade and the option of visa-free travel. Moreover, Finland has managed to integrate fully within the EU where it serves as an important driver in the
Generally however, “rationalist theories start from the assumption that international organizations are instrumental associations which help their members to maximize their utilities.” (Schimmelfennig 200). NATO as a whole disposes of higher military power, creating for each member state the force of deterrence so central to structural realism (this is perhaps best illustrated in the practice of nuclear weapons sharing). As it stands, the Eurasian Union is mainly presented as a project for economic integration, based on the assumption that “Russia is better served by building its own coalition instead of aligning with the economies of the West” (Neyfakh). This latent power is the second form of central power (cf. Mearsheimer 79). Thus, both forms of power are present in the case at hand, as NATO unites military power, while the association agreement mainly aimed at economic