Why Did the Soviet Union Intervene in Hungary and Not Poland in 1956?
Why did the Soviet Union intervene in Hungary and not Poland in 1956?
‘Given the growing sense of national euphoria sweeping eastern Europe in 1955-1956, a full-scale decolonisation of the Soviet Empire was not considered beyond the bounds of geopolitical possibility’. The decision of the Soviet Union to invade Hungary in 1956, whilst acknowledging the need to control events in Poland, came about through a myriad of complex reasons as well as the collapse of the old Hegemony, following Krushchev’s ‘secret speech’ (denouncing the policies adopted by Stalin, during his tenure). Traditionally historians identify three theories to explain the Soviet invasion of Hungary and not Poland in 1956. The initial ‘historical theses’, recognises inherent differences in the historical background of these two communist satellite states. Supporters of this theory suggest that due to the large scale damage inflicted upon Poland in World War II, compared with the relatively minor necessary disruption of Hungary during the war, the Hungarian state would approach 1956 in a much more stable position from which to counter Soviet advances. Historical support of this theory suggests that the opportunity for the Soviet Union to Invade Hungary allowed for a somewhat ‘novel experience’. The Second theory, ‘personality thesis’, looks into the roles of different individuals, specifically Edward Ochab in Poland and Mátyás Rákosi in Hungary, in facilitating potential anti-Soviet uprisings in their respective citizenries. The final argument, the ‘neutrality thesis’, suggests that the Soviet Union reacted more fervently to the actions of the Hungarians, following their declaration of neutrality and subsequent withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. In this essay I shall argue that whilst the above theses’ reflect traditional viewpoints on the 1956 Hungarian Uprising, as well as the decision of the Soviet Union not to intervene in Poland, they do not fully explain these events. Therefore further
‘Given the growing sense of national euphoria sweeping eastern Europe in 1955-1956, a full-scale decolonisation of the Soviet Empire was not considered beyond the bounds of geopolitical possibility’. The decision of the Soviet Union to invade Hungary in 1956, whilst acknowledging the need to control events in Poland, came about through a myriad of complex reasons as well as the collapse of the old Hegemony, following Krushchev’s ‘secret speech’ (denouncing the policies adopted by Stalin, during his tenure). Traditionally historians identify three theories to explain the Soviet invasion of Hungary and not Poland in 1956. The initial ‘historical theses’, recognises inherent differences in the historical background of these two communist satellite states. Supporters of this theory suggest that due to the large scale damage inflicted upon Poland in World War II, compared with the relatively minor necessary disruption of Hungary during the war, the Hungarian state would approach 1956 in a much more stable position from which to counter Soviet advances. Historical support of this theory suggests that the opportunity for the Soviet Union to Invade Hungary allowed for a somewhat ‘novel experience’. The Second theory, ‘personality thesis’, looks into the roles of different individuals, specifically Edward Ochab in Poland and Mátyás Rákosi in Hungary, in facilitating potential anti-Soviet uprisings in their respective citizenries. The final argument, the ‘neutrality thesis’, suggests that the Soviet Union reacted more fervently to the actions of the Hungarians, following their declaration of neutrality and subsequent withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. In this essay I shall argue that whilst the above theses’ reflect traditional viewpoints on the 1956 Hungarian Uprising, as well as the decision of the Soviet Union not to intervene in Poland, they do not fully explain these events. Therefore further