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Articles
The Realist Tradition in American
Public Opinion
Daniel W. Drezner
For more than half a century, realist scholars of international relations have maintained that their world view is inimical to the
American public. For a variety of reasons—inchoate attitudes, national history, American exceptionalism—realists assert that the
U.S. government pursues realist policies in spite and not because of public opinion. Indeed, most IR scholars share this “anti-realist assumption.” To determine the empirical validity of the anti-realist assumption, this paper re-examines survey and experimental data on the mass public’s attitudes towards foreign policy priorities and world views, the use of force, and foreign economic policy over the past three decades. The results suggest that, far from disliking realism, Americans are at least as comfortable with the logic of realpolitik as they are with liberal internationalism. The persistence of the anti-realist assumption might be due to an ironic fact:
American elites are more predisposed towards liberal internationalism than the rest of the American public.
abstaining from moral or ideological crusades designed to make the world more like America. This is fundamentally at odds with the more optimistic tropes inherent in liberal internationalism. Liberals would argue that multilateral regimes, democratic institutions, and economic interdependence can ameliorate the effects of anarchy. In such a
Lockean world, the export of American values and norms advances American interests by getting others to want what
Americans want.3
Realists and non-realists alike accept Louis Hartz’s supposition that the Lockean worldview has an ideological chokehold over the American body politic.4 What I label the anti-realist assumption serves many useful purposes for the realist paradigm. If the American public dislikes realism, then U.S. foreign policy outputs represent a tough test of the theory. Any
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⅜
Articles
The Realist Tradition in American
Public Opinion
Daniel W. Drezner
For more than half a century, realist scholars of international relations have maintained that their world view is inimical to the
American public. For a variety of reasons—inchoate attitudes, national history, American exceptionalism—realists assert that the
U.S. government pursues realist policies in spite and not because of public opinion. Indeed, most IR scholars share this “anti-realist assumption.” To determine the empirical validity of the anti-realist assumption, this paper re-examines survey and experimental data on the mass public’s attitudes towards foreign policy priorities and world views, the use of force, and foreign economic policy over the past three decades. The results suggest that, far from disliking realism, Americans are at least as comfortable with the logic of realpolitik as they are with liberal internationalism. The persistence of the anti-realist assumption might be due to an ironic fact:
American elites are more predisposed towards liberal internationalism than the rest of the American public.
abstaining from moral or ideological crusades designed to make the world more like America. This is fundamentally at odds with the more optimistic tropes inherent in liberal internationalism. Liberals would argue that multilateral regimes, democratic institutions, and economic interdependence can ameliorate the effects of anarchy. In such a
Lockean world, the export of American values and norms advances American interests by getting others to want what
Americans want.3
Realists and non-realists alike accept Louis Hartz’s supposition that the Lockean worldview has an ideological chokehold over the American body politic.4 What I label the anti-realist assumption serves many useful purposes for the realist paradigm. If the American public dislikes realism, then U.S. foreign policy outputs represent a tough test of the theory. Any