Space Shuttle Challenger Failure

In January of 1985, the Space Shuttle Challenger was scheduled for launch, the initial launch date scheduled for January 22, 1986. Most of the initial planning(assessing payloads/cargo space) went through without fault. The flight personnel were on track with training and the launch seemed to be a go.(NASA.gov) Many problems would arise, some stemming from previous knowledge, dating back to 1977, the initial test of Martin Thiokol Institute's or MTI's Solid Rocket Booster. The Solid Rocket Booster(SRB) which was a key element in the launch was tested and with only one hitch, possible o-ring failure, passed for a series of missions, all showing evidence of possible problems to future launches. The initial test simulated the effects
The primary o-ring of mission (STS) 51-C at a temperature of 53 degrees had shown signs of erosion with a line of black soot making its way past the primary o-ring. More thought to the 40 degree standard was advised.(McDonald) The date was January 15, 1986, time to perform the Flight Readiness Review for the Challenger mission. During this review, all aspects of flight preparation should be assessed. Attendees confirmed that all equipment and operational plans had been certified ready by the responsible manager within NASA. No mention of o-rings was made.(NASA.gov) On January 15. After the review all signs were a go until a previous mission postponed the launch date by 2 days. The new date became problematic and the flight was postponed and even relocated. With the third reschedule more problems started to show, No night lighting postponed the flight again and on the morning after, bad weather struck once more. At this point, NASA, severely perturbed, was determined to launch no matter the condition. The final and concrete launch date was set for January 28, 1986, on a cold clear
This conference was held after the information of the cold weather had arisen. The meeting, comprised of people from NASA as well as engineers from MTI's SRB Project, hinged on the knowledge that possible failure of MTI's SRB could occur. Initial response from MTI's SRB Project was that the launch should be a no go. Allan McDonald, lead engineer on the project recalls that one instant we had postponed the launch, what seemed like mere minutes later, the launch was declared a go. Allan McDonald was approached by NASA to sign a document that would clear the boosters for launch. McDonald responded with the statement, “If I were the Launch Director, I would cancel the launch.”(McDonald) Still, with this statement uttered, NASA wanted written proof that Thiokol had cleared the boosters for launch. McDonald refused to sign and NASA decided to go over his head to Thiokol, himself. A fax was sent and hours later, signature in hand. The 73 second disaster would soon be