Should The Soviet Union Re-Shaped American Foreign Policy?

Foreign policy of both the United States and the Soviet Union took a different turn at the end of World War II, as both nations emerged as Superpowers. The Soviets were at ease due to the crippling of the Germany Empire, and the elimination of the threat of Fascism along their western boarders, and the United States believed they had ended any threats against them with the development and use of atomic weapons. The desire to lead the world in trade and industry, developments in space and science, and their ideological differences known as communism and capitalism would lead both nations and leaders into an unforeseen decade’s long war that was never declared by either participant, yet obvious to the world around them. The leaders of the two
Truman introduced to Congress and the American people, the Truman Doctrine in March 1947, where the President used fear in describing the Soviet Communism as a threat of our freedoms, both economically and personally. Furthermore, according to Judge & Langdon (2016) he vowed that the United States must rise to the call of any nation wishing to establish a government free of subjugation by armed militias or pressures by outside parties, no doubt meaning the Soviet Union. The Truman Doctrine re-shaped American foreign policy as Congress gave the office of the Presidency the power to wage acts of war without a formal declaration of war. The doctrine paved the way for economic, military and political support to any nation or regime attempting to resist Soviet aggression. Containment was the term introduced by U.S. State Department policy planner George Keenan to describe the foreign policy of the Truman
Eisenhower ran his campaign on the premise that he would strengthen the military, but the changing political landscape would lead the President in a slightly new direction. Secretary of State Dulles began to speak against containment, stating it was a defense that could not be successful against an aggressive policy, paving the road towards a more proactive approach in the fight against communism. The author LaFeber (2008) states that upon his return from a trip to Korea in December 1952, the President made it very clear that if an agreement could not be reached quickly the United States might react “under the circumstances of their choosing.” Thus, referring to the use of nuclear weapons. This new approach became known as “brinkmanship” (p.155