Putnam's Argument Against The BIV Hypothesis

Introduction
A plethora of thought experiments seek to answer inquiries regarding the external world, a particular of which being the brain-in-a-vat (BIV) experiment. Skeptics suggest that the BIV hypothesis can never be completely denied and this is thus evidence, that nothing substantial about the external world can ever be concluded. Hilary Putnam claims however, that when combined with semantic externalism, the BIV hypothesis cannot be true. This essay will demonstrate that Putnam’s argument against the BIV hypothesis is lacking. To accomplish this, this essay will: 1) define semantic externalism; 2) describe the BIV experiment; 3) explain Putnam’s argument against said experiment; 4) object against Putnam’s assertion that semantic externalism
That is to say, in order to specifically refer to anything, one must experience some sort of “causal exposure” from it, no matter how indirect. As Putnam puts it, “a large and complex system to representations, both verbal and visual, still does not have an intrinsic, built-in, magical connection with what it represents—a connection independent of how it was caused and what the dispositions of the speaker or thinker
He insists that “the supposition that we are actually brains in a vat, although it violates no physical law, and is perfectly consistent with everything we have experienced, cannot possibly be true […] because it is […] self-refuting.” The foundation of this assertion rests in semantic externalism. As mentioned above, a reference is considered valid by semantic externalism only if the origin of the reference and the target of the reference share a causal relationship. Hence, BIVs cannot refer to themselves as BIVs, because when they utter or think the words “brain” and “vat,” they are referring to something other than an actual “brain” or “vat” (as BIVs have no occasion to interact with that which exists in the external world). Putnam offers a variety of explanations as to what the BIVs are really referring to (based on the available causes of the BIVs’ thoughts). It is not important however, to determine the correct theory. Rather, the only thing that needs to be acknowledged is, that whatever the BIVs refer to as “BIVs” is substantially different from what we would refer to as BIVs. Thus, we cannot possible be BIVs, because in the case that we are BIVs, we would fail to refer to ourselves as such, since the statement “I am a BIV” will become logically