Pluralism
Concept Paper of Pluralism
Yue Zhang
George Washington University
(TA: Joey Wachtel)
Pluralism in contemporary academic field implies multiple meanings. One interpretation of pluralism is "the idea, classically formulated by Isaiah Berlin, that there is a plurality of distinct or 'incommensurable' values or goods" (Crowder, 2010). The word 'incommensurable' here means, in short, incomparable. This is because pluralism believes in multiple values, and there is no single fundamental value acting as denominator to rank between different values. It is almost undoubtedly that people value much goodness such as friendship, health and freedom. These values, from a utilitarian's perspective, could be calculated to one fundamental value, say utility. Hence abovementioned good values along with others could be converted to utility. However, pluralists does not agree with this. Schaber (1999) argued 'some values are not reducible to one fundamental value and as a consequence not measurable in terms of a fundamental value'. According to Crowder (2002), the value pluralism can be argued from the possibility of rational regret. The argument starts with two options A and B, and we can only choose one. We often regret that we did not choose the other one after the decision is made. The regret is rational in many cases. Rationality will not be valid if there is only one value as people will not regret for choosing the option with higher fundamental value over the lesser one. There is no diminished value. Thus, the existence of rational regret proves value pluralism.
However, this regret argument is not highly rigorous as a utilitarian is capable of explaining rational regret from a different perspective. Schaber (1999) questioned the true reason of regret. He gave an example of either saving four people from island A or saving one people from island B. From monist point of view. People are regretting not because the
Yue Zhang
George Washington University
(TA: Joey Wachtel)
Pluralism in contemporary academic field implies multiple meanings. One interpretation of pluralism is "the idea, classically formulated by Isaiah Berlin, that there is a plurality of distinct or 'incommensurable' values or goods" (Crowder, 2010). The word 'incommensurable' here means, in short, incomparable. This is because pluralism believes in multiple values, and there is no single fundamental value acting as denominator to rank between different values. It is almost undoubtedly that people value much goodness such as friendship, health and freedom. These values, from a utilitarian's perspective, could be calculated to one fundamental value, say utility. Hence abovementioned good values along with others could be converted to utility. However, pluralists does not agree with this. Schaber (1999) argued 'some values are not reducible to one fundamental value and as a consequence not measurable in terms of a fundamental value'. According to Crowder (2002), the value pluralism can be argued from the possibility of rational regret. The argument starts with two options A and B, and we can only choose one. We often regret that we did not choose the other one after the decision is made. The regret is rational in many cases. Rationality will not be valid if there is only one value as people will not regret for choosing the option with higher fundamental value over the lesser one. There is no diminished value. Thus, the existence of rational regret proves value pluralism.
However, this regret argument is not highly rigorous as a utilitarian is capable of explaining rational regret from a different perspective. Schaber (1999) questioned the true reason of regret. He gave an example of either saving four people from island A or saving one people from island B. From monist point of view. People are regretting not because the