Individua Foot's Naturalism

At the centre of Aristotelian Naturalism is that moral goodness is a kind of species-specific natural goodness. As Foot remarks in Natural Goodness:
‘I believe that evaluations of human will and action share a conceptual structure with evaluations of characteristics and operations of other living things, and can only be understood in these terms. I want to show moral evil as ‘a kind of natural defect’. Life will be at the centre of my discussion, and the fact that a human action or disposition is good of its kind will be taken to be simply a fact about a given feature of a certain kind of living thing.’
Aristotelian Naturalism is a notion of human nature that we may refer to as human form. The importance of life-form concepts has been demonstrated by Thompson.
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Let us start here with an issue related to the philosophy of biology. In her central thesis, Foot asserts, that there is a natural goodness that is specific to each species. The goodness in question is not related to an
In her argument, she draws heavily upon the essay ‘The Representation of Life’ by Michael Thompson. Foot believes that there is a whole set of concepts that apply to living things and only to living things, considered in their own right. For instance, these include, welfare, interests and flourishing. Much of this notion is based on Foot’s use of G.E.M. Anscombes description of “Aristotelian necessities”. An “Aristotelian necessity” is something that is necessary for a particular thing in order for it to be a successful member of its type. It is for this reason, “good” is attached to these necessitates. Foot has adopted a more specific use of this term to refer to necessitates. In her explanation, these necessities are fulfilled in order for a member of a species “to be as they should be”, and to do what “they should do” in order to live a flourishing