Hume natural and artificial virtues
In this essay I will discuss the differences between Hume's 'natural' and 'artificial' virtues. I will first give Hume's explanation of why there is a need for a distinction or classification of virtues, and the basis on which he makes the distinction, before describing the two categories and their criteria. I will look at the problems with Hume's account of the distinction, particularly justice. Finally I will describe how the various problems cast doubt on Hume's distinction.
Hume's Virtues and the need to distinguish In discussing the principles from which we determine moral good or evil, virtue or vice, Hume argues that because the number of situations we may encounter is 'infinite' it would be absurd to imagine an 'original instinct' or individual principle for each possibility. (T3.1.2.6)1 Instead he suggests that, following the usual maxim of nature producing diversity from limited principles, we should look for more general principles. Hume suggests looking for those general principles in nature but cautions on the ambiguous and various senses of the word 'natural'. (T 3.1.2.7) He says later that 'the word natural...is of so loose a signification, that it seems vain to dispute, whether justice be natural or not' (EPM Appx. 3.9.) It is important that he clears this up early, the categorisation of several virtues, notably 'justice', depends critically on a clear definition. Leaving 'natural' open to interpretation would also raise difficulties in placing many of the 70 or more 'virtues he names. If the virtues could category hop it might cause problems for the idea of having a distinction at all. Having raised this issue he resolves it by describing various senses or contexts in which 'natural' could be commonly understood:
1. Nature can be understood as counter to, or 'oppose'd to', miracles and if understood in that context then everything, except miracles themselves but including virtue and vice, would be considered natural. (T3.1.2.7)
2. Nature may
Hume's Virtues and the need to distinguish In discussing the principles from which we determine moral good or evil, virtue or vice, Hume argues that because the number of situations we may encounter is 'infinite' it would be absurd to imagine an 'original instinct' or individual principle for each possibility. (T3.1.2.6)1 Instead he suggests that, following the usual maxim of nature producing diversity from limited principles, we should look for more general principles. Hume suggests looking for those general principles in nature but cautions on the ambiguous and various senses of the word 'natural'. (T 3.1.2.7) He says later that 'the word natural...is of so loose a signification, that it seems vain to dispute, whether justice be natural or not' (EPM Appx. 3.9.) It is important that he clears this up early, the categorisation of several virtues, notably 'justice', depends critically on a clear definition. Leaving 'natural' open to interpretation would also raise difficulties in placing many of the 70 or more 'virtues he names. If the virtues could category hop it might cause problems for the idea of having a distinction at all. Having raised this issue he resolves it by describing various senses or contexts in which 'natural' could be commonly understood:
1. Nature can be understood as counter to, or 'oppose'd to', miracles and if understood in that context then everything, except miracles themselves but including virtue and vice, would be considered natural. (T3.1.2.7)
2. Nature may