Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia
Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia
In December of 1992, the United States military landed in Somalia. The Somali civil war caused a famine that claimed the lives of three hundred thousand people and threatened the lives of two million more. As word of these gross human rights violations spread, the media and general public pressured the government into taking action in Somalia. Subsequently, with the United Nations’ consent, twenty-eight thousand soldiers were deployed to put an end to the mass starvation that was taking place. Never before had the UN Security Council sanctioned an intervention without the express permission from the nation in question. Liberalism and Solidarism encourage humanitarian intervention when proper rules are followed, where as Realism does not support the use of force for humanitarian intervention in any circumstance. The ideology behind intervention in Somalia is best explained by Solidarism, however, the sequence of events that took place after US troops landed, exemplifies all that Realists object to in humanitarian intervention. The steps that the United States and the United Nations took to stop the famine were legitimate. Since Somalia was in a state of chaos and anarchy, the US and UN did not intervene against a nation’s will. Mark R. Amstutz states, “Because all civil authority had broken down in Somalia as a result of war, the Security Council-sanctioned UNITAF provided the necessary legitimacy for the US-led operation to restore order that thereby resume humanitarian relief. However, it is important to emphasize that this UN-sanctioned force was legally unprecedented: it was the first time that the Security Council had authorized intervention in a state without its consent,” (Amstutz 147). Deciding to step in and aid the starving Somalis was a revolutionary event.
Solidarist political theory stresses that there are four precautionary principles: the right intention, last resort, proportional means, and reasonable
In December of 1992, the United States military landed in Somalia. The Somali civil war caused a famine that claimed the lives of three hundred thousand people and threatened the lives of two million more. As word of these gross human rights violations spread, the media and general public pressured the government into taking action in Somalia. Subsequently, with the United Nations’ consent, twenty-eight thousand soldiers were deployed to put an end to the mass starvation that was taking place. Never before had the UN Security Council sanctioned an intervention without the express permission from the nation in question. Liberalism and Solidarism encourage humanitarian intervention when proper rules are followed, where as Realism does not support the use of force for humanitarian intervention in any circumstance. The ideology behind intervention in Somalia is best explained by Solidarism, however, the sequence of events that took place after US troops landed, exemplifies all that Realists object to in humanitarian intervention. The steps that the United States and the United Nations took to stop the famine were legitimate. Since Somalia was in a state of chaos and anarchy, the US and UN did not intervene against a nation’s will. Mark R. Amstutz states, “Because all civil authority had broken down in Somalia as a result of war, the Security Council-sanctioned UNITAF provided the necessary legitimacy for the US-led operation to restore order that thereby resume humanitarian relief. However, it is important to emphasize that this UN-sanctioned force was legally unprecedented: it was the first time that the Security Council had authorized intervention in a state without its consent,” (Amstutz 147). Deciding to step in and aid the starving Somalis was a revolutionary event.
Solidarist political theory stresses that there are four precautionary principles: the right intention, last resort, proportional means, and reasonable
Cited: Amstutz, Mark R. “Case 7-3: U.S. Intervention in Somalia.” International Ethics Concepts, Theories, and Cases In Global Politics. 2nd ed. USA: Rowan and Littlefield, 2005. 145-149. Bradol, Jean-Herve. “The Sacrificial International Order and Humanitarian Action.” Introduction. In the Shadow of ‘Just Wars’ Violence, Politics and Humanitarian Action. By Medecines Sans Frontieres. Ed. Fabrice Weissman and Fiona Terry. Trans. Vincent Homolka, Roger Leverdiier, and Fiona Terry. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004. 6. Carpenter, Ted Galen. “Setting a Dangerous Precedent in Somalia.” CATO Institute. 18 Dec. 1992. 12 Dec. 2006 <http://cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb-020.html>. Chomsky, Noam. “Assessing Humanitarian Intent.” The New Military Humanism . Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 1999. 69-70. Howe, Jonathan T. “The United States and United bations in Somalia: the Limits of Involvement.” Summer 1995. Academic OneFile. Thomson Gale. Earl Gregg Swem Lib. at the Coll. of William and Mary, Williamsburg, VA. 11 Dec. 2006 <http://find.galegroup/com/itx/infomark.do?&contentSet=IAC-Documents&type=retrieve&tabID=T002&prodId=AONE*docId=A17157090&source=gale&srcprod=AONE&userGroupName=viva_wm&version=1.0>. “The Perils of Humanitarian Intervention.” Spring 1994. Professional Development Collection. EBSCO. Earl Gregg Swem Library at the Coll. of William and Mary, Williamsburg, VA. 12 Dec. 2006 <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=tfh&AN=9506081692&site=ehost-live>. Wheeler, Nicholas J. “From Famine Relief to ‘Humanitarian War’: The US and UN Intervention in Somalia.” Saving Strangers. USA: Oxford University Press, 2000. 172-207.