A strategy game is mainly based on decision makingskills. There are many strategy games found and one thing they have in common is that they all require internal decision style thinking. The Greek word “strategy” comes from the word meaning generalship. Some examples of strategy games would be tictac tow, chess etc. Game strategies are largely related to math because even though they don’t require a person to solve math problems like in mathematical puzzles, but they require the person to think mathematically. Basic Mathematical Game Strategies Basic strategy games are particularly suitable as starting points of investigations. Players instinctively to try to discover a winning strategy and usually the best way to do this is to analyses the outcomes for series of moves, that usually occur when a person can relate something they learned to something they’re trying to do. For example solve the ancient game known as NIM. NIM is a mathematical game of strategy, in which two players take turns removing objects from distinct piles. On
each turn, a player must remove at least one object and may remove any numbering of
the particular object they have chosen.
Abstract Strategy
Another type of strategy games is under the category of Abstract strategy
games. Abstract strategy game is a game that depends on luck, and doesn’t have a
theme to rely on understanding the rules. Almost all abstract strategy games will
Sharaf 2
conform to the strictest definition of a game board, card, or title game in which there
is no hidden information any nondeterministic elements. Some examples of abstract
strategy games are chess, checkers. There is an unbreakable bond between the
relationships in games such as puzzles, every board position presents the player with
the way they think and the way they want to take their next move. Which also goes...
... 2012 
 Application Of GameTheory to Business: Preliminary Findings for Term paper
Saurabh Mandhanya 11p164Rajat Barve 11p157Shashank Gupta 11p166Deepak Bansal 11P133Padmini Narayan 11p152Lizanne Marie Raphael 11P025 
[ The Kargil War: Analysis and Learning Through GameTheory ] 

Introduction
India and Pakistan have been involved in conflict over Kashmir since Independence. It has led to numerous wars and attacks. The relations and wars over Kashmir can be studied using GameTheory. Tit for Tat policy has been practiced by both nations. The pay of for wars for both countries has been changing depending on the context. This context has been based on many parameters –
1. Ally countries – US and China are widely regarded as Pakistan allies. China has been against India due to border issues. USSR has been traditionally supporting India until recently. The situation keeps on changing with changing stance of allies.
2. International support  International communities like UN tries to solve the conflict through negotiations.
3. Military strength – It keeps on changing depending upon development and purchase of weapons on both sides.
4. Resources including financial and others – India has always been in a relatively better position due to more available resources.
5. Leadership of both countries especially of Pakistan (Army Rule) – Army Rulers might...
...Topic 5: GameTheory Applied to the Movie and Aviation Industries
I. Case study: GameTheory Applied to the Movie Business
In the movie business, one of the trickiest decisions producers face is what type of movie to make. Suppose there are 2 movie studios and that their producers are trying to decide whether to make an Action Adventure (AA) or Romantic Comedy (RC) movie. Suppose each of the studios does not know what type of movie the competing studio is planning to make that same year and that they do not trust each other in the least. They face the following payoff matrix.
Studio 1
RC AA
Studio 2 RC (50,50) (90,60)
AA (60,90) (75,75)
(Figures show total estimated box office revenues in $ millions for Studio 1, Studio 2.)
What strategy (make an AA or RC movie) should each of the studios chose?
What is the payoff to each of the 2 studios given the strategies they choose?
Answer:
From Studio 1’s perspective:
Studio 1’s payoff
RC 50
RC
AA 90
Firm 2
RC 60
AA
AA 75
Same result from Studio 2’s perspective.
From studio 1’ s perspective: if studio 2 makes a RC, studio 1’s payoff is $50 million if it also makes a RC and $90 million if it makes an AA. If studio 2 makes an AA movie, studio 1’s payoff is $60 million if it makes a RC and...
...no matter what the other person does this is always better? Will such meek be able to survive when they give an open chance to exploiters to keep defecting and gaining? Will the meek inherit the earth?
The world has been preaching moral philosophy and few have been really practicing them. Many quote versus from the Bible and other religious books like above. Some believe that the world is still going on because of some good left in it and others think it is because people have learnt to punish the defectors. Let us study these philosophies in comparison with Prisoners Dilemma & TitForTat strategy in Gametheory.
Game theorists, like gamblers and children, can become addicted to iterated games. Their classic example is the Prisoner’s Dilemma, whose diabolical simplicity has given rise to thousands of scientific publications. Two players are engaged in the game. They have to choose between two options, which we term Cooperate or Defect. If both cooperate, they can earn three points apiece as reward. If both defect, they get only one point each, which is the punishment for failing to join forces. If one player defects while the other cooperates, then the defector receives five points (this is the temptation) while the trusting cooperator receives no points at all (this is the sucker’s payoff).
How will the rational player act? By defecting, of course. This is the right choice, no matter what...
...GameTheory
The game begins with a case that occurred on two prisoners. Both prisoners were suspected criminals and their work. Both prisoners were placed in a different room, then to be given the question of whether it is true they are committing a crime or not. Option given is: If the prisoner A prisoner confessed while B does not confess, then A will be free, while B will get a 6 month sentence. If they plead not guilty, then it will get a 1 month prison sentence. And if both confess, they will each get a 3 month prison sentence.
Zerosum game
In gametheory and economic theory, a zero–sum game is a mathematical representation of a situation in which a participant's gain (or loss) of utility is exactly balanced by the losses (or gains) of the utility of the other participant(s). If the total gains of the participants are added up, and the total losses are subtracted, they will sum to zero.
Prisoners dilemma game is an archeptypal example of of a nonzero sum game.The distinction between a zero sum game and a nonzero sum game is crucial.In zero sum game,with two players for simplicity,the utilities of players always sum to zero wathever the game’s outcome.On certain simplifying assumption,a zero sum game is equivalent to a zero money sum game.In this circumstances,zero sum...
...Topic Ten: Oligopoly and GameTheory
1. Suppose Penguin and Joker are the only two firms in the death ray market. Each firm is considering two possible pricing strategies – either P = $700 or
P = $1500 – for their goods. The following payoff matrix gives the profit outcomes (in $m).
Joker
 P = $700  P = $1500 
Penguin
P = $700  30
35
 27
41

P = $1500  35
29
 38
39

(a) What price will each of the firms choose if they make their decisions independently, following a maximin strategy? Explain how you determined your answer.
(b) What is meant by the term collusion? In general, what is the incentive for firms in an oligopoly market to collude? Explain.
(c) Based on the payoffs for Penguin and Joker (shown above) and your solution in (a), could these firms benefit by colluding? Explain.
2. Suppose Alpha and Romeo are the only two firms in the automobile market. Each firm plans to put only one model onto the market. They are considering two possible choices – a standard model at P = $50,000 or a luxury model at
P = $80,000. The following payoff matrix gives the profit outcomes (in $m).
Romeo
 P = $50,000  P = $80,000 
Alpha
P = $50,000  40
35
 45
30

P = $80,000  35
40
 30
45

(a) What price will each of the firms choose if they make their decisions independently, following a maximin strategy?...
...consult the experts of the gametheory at this point. In the 1980’s Axelrod and Hamilton worked on a famous problem in the gametheory, the Prisoner’s Dilemma, exactly because it deals with this problem. The rational pursuit of individual selfinterest drives everybody into an outcome that is not favored by anybody. Imagine two partners in a crime being interrogated at the same time. Each one has two options, cooperate with the other and keep quiet or betray the other and confess. Case C, we can say, is if both cooperate then the police cannot get much out of them and they will both get a light sentence (2 years); if one defects and the other keeps quiet then the traitor will get an even lighter sentence (1 year) – this is case B. If the one who cooperates gets the longest sentence (10 years), this is the worst end of the deal and we can call this case S. In a case when both betray one another they will both get a sentence (6 years) longer than if they had cooperated but lighter than if one had kept quiet and the other spoke, and this is case D.
Out of the four outcomes, B is the best and S is the worst from an individualistic point of view, while the order of preference is B, C, S, D. We should realize that this is a nonzero sum game. In a zerosum game, my loss is your gain; for example, if we are trying to divide a certain amount of money in the bank into two, anything over fifty...
...Negotiation 

The use of GameTheory could be a powerful force in negotiation. Investigate the different ways that GameTheory can be used or manipulated to change an outcome in a negotiation. 

Negotiation 

The use of GameTheory could be a powerful force in negotiation. Investigate the different ways that GameTheory can be used or manipulated to change an outcome in a negotiation. 

Quentin Dutartre
Yash Ruia
Damien Canneva
Kilian Bus
Emilien Allier
David Schil
Quentin Dutartre
Yash Ruia
Damien Canneva
Kilian Bus
Emilien Allier
David Schil
Contents
Introduction 2
What is the Gametheory? 2
Theory 4
Making commitments: promises and threats 4
Basic situation 4
Unique Win/Win situation 5
Commitments and side payments 5
Prisoner’s dilemma 7
The Simplest Game: Two Person with a Fixed Pie 8
Tacit Barganining 8
How to act during a negotiation 9
Breakthrough Strategy 9
Tactics 10
Limits 11
The modelisation 11
The interpretation 12
Conclusion 13
Sources 13
Introduction
Our group decided to work on the topic three: “The use of GameTheory could be a powerful force in negotiation. Investigate the different ways that GameTheory can be used or manipulated to change...
...Selected chapters from draft of
An Introduction to GameTheory by Martin J. Osborne
Please send comments to Martin J. Osborne Department of Economics 150 St. George Street University of Toronto Toronto, Canada M5S 3G7 email: martin.osborne@utoronto.ca
This version:
2000/11/6
Copyright c 1995–2000 by Martin J. Osborne All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from Oxford University Press.
Contents
Preface 1
xiii
Introduction 1 1.1 What is gametheory? 1 An outline of the history of gametheory John von Neumann 3 1.2 The theory of rational choice 4 1.3 Coming attractions 7 Notes 8
3
I
2
Games with Perfect Information
9
Nash Equilibrium: Theory 11 2.1 Strategic games 11 2.2 Example: the Prisoner’s Dilemma 12 2.3 Example: Bach or Stravinsky? 16 2.4 Example: Matching Pennies 17 2.5 Example: the Stag Hunt 18 2.6 Nash equilibrium 19 John F. Nash, Jr. 20 Studying Nash equilibrium experimentally 22 2.7 Examples of Nash equilibrium 24 Experimental evidence on the Prisoner’s Dilemma 26 Focal points 30 2.8 Best response functions 33 2.9 Dominated actions 43 2.10 Equilibrium in a single population: symmetric games and symmetric...