The Evidence Amendment (Evidence of silence) Act 2013 has outlined the extent to which the law balances the rights of suspects and victims in the criminal investigation process. Essentially, the Act allows an unfavourable inference to be drawn on the suspects if they fail to mention something they will later rely on in the proceedings. Thus, the suspect’s right on silence is reduced. In the case R v Swaffield (1998), the suspect was charged with three criminal offences and remained silent to police questions after unknowingly confessing to a police officer who recorded him without his knowledge or consent. Later on, the recorded ‘involuntary’ confession was presented to the courts of Australia where the case was appealed to the High Court. The High Court of Australia addressed the issue in ‘context of voluntary confessions and the degree to which they are admissible in respect of voluntariness, unfairness and public policy considerations.’ In this situation, the procedural fairness has been breached where the police failed to present voluntarily confession evidence without limiting the right on silence of the offender. However, the High Court judges applied ‘discretion to exclude the evidence for unfairness’. This precedential case stated that “the purpose of that discretion is the protection of the rights and privileges of the accused”, supported by the Sydney Morning Herald’s article ‘Protecting the rule of law’ that “the right to silence is an important protection for people who feel their poorly articulated explanations would be twisted by investigators”. Therefore, it can be argued that justice was achieved to a certain extent in balancing the rights of suspects since the High Court established a narrow operation of the discretion for the purpose of maintaining the accused’s rights in respect to voluntary confession and procedural
The Evidence Amendment (Evidence of silence) Act 2013 has outlined the extent to which the law balances the rights of suspects and victims in the criminal investigation process. Essentially, the Act allows an unfavourable inference to be drawn on the suspects if they fail to mention something they will later rely on in the proceedings. Thus, the suspect’s right on silence is reduced. In the case R v Swaffield (1998), the suspect was charged with three criminal offences and remained silent to police questions after unknowingly confessing to a police officer who recorded him without his knowledge or consent. Later on, the recorded ‘involuntary’ confession was presented to the courts of Australia where the case was appealed to the High Court. The High Court of Australia addressed the issue in ‘context of voluntary confessions and the degree to which they are admissible in respect of voluntariness, unfairness and public policy considerations.’ In this situation, the procedural fairness has been breached where the police failed to present voluntarily confession evidence without limiting the right on silence of the offender. However, the High Court judges applied ‘discretion to exclude the evidence for unfairness’. This precedential case stated that “the purpose of that discretion is the protection of the rights and privileges of the accused”, supported by the Sydney Morning Herald’s article ‘Protecting the rule of law’ that “the right to silence is an important protection for people who feel their poorly articulated explanations would be twisted by investigators”. Therefore, it can be argued that justice was achieved to a certain extent in balancing the rights of suspects since the High Court established a narrow operation of the discretion for the purpose of maintaining the accused’s rights in respect to voluntary confession and procedural