Covert Action
Covert Action
A Necessary Evil?
The term “Covert Action” brings with it a connotation of shadowy figures wrapped in secrecy and intrigue. It also brings with it a substantial amount of moral questions as to “what is right.” The use of covert action has been widely publicized since the early seventies, but trying to find out the truth to these events has been difficult to say the least. What is even more difficult, is historically recording these events into categories of successes or failures. These operations are difficult to dissect because of their secrecy and although events have been recorded, some facts simply aren’t apparent. This paper will seek to identify the complex issues associated with covert operations. United States policy on covert action since World War II acknowledges two facts which are rarely taken into consideration when discussing these operations. The first is the sheer magnitude of these operations. Secret wars involve not only large sums of money, but armies of soldiers as well. Secondly, successes of these operations have been at times misrepresented or utter blunders.(1) History will show the legitimacy (or lack of) of these operations and how strategically important they may have been at the time. History will also show and “connect the dots” as to the future impact and contradiction of perceived successes.
Iran Coup d’état 1953
Operation TPAJAX The post-war period brought with it the fear of Communism to the United States. This belief was deeply ingrained in day-to-day life and the nation’s number one priority in regards to national security. In Iran, a plan to nationalize its oil industry brought about great concern with the British.(2) The British intelligence service (SIS) partnered with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to develop a plan to ensure continued control of oil interests in Iran and eradicate the movement to nationalize the oil industry. At this point in time, Great Britain had total
A Necessary Evil?
The term “Covert Action” brings with it a connotation of shadowy figures wrapped in secrecy and intrigue. It also brings with it a substantial amount of moral questions as to “what is right.” The use of covert action has been widely publicized since the early seventies, but trying to find out the truth to these events has been difficult to say the least. What is even more difficult, is historically recording these events into categories of successes or failures. These operations are difficult to dissect because of their secrecy and although events have been recorded, some facts simply aren’t apparent. This paper will seek to identify the complex issues associated with covert operations. United States policy on covert action since World War II acknowledges two facts which are rarely taken into consideration when discussing these operations. The first is the sheer magnitude of these operations. Secret wars involve not only large sums of money, but armies of soldiers as well. Secondly, successes of these operations have been at times misrepresented or utter blunders.(1) History will show the legitimacy (or lack of) of these operations and how strategically important they may have been at the time. History will also show and “connect the dots” as to the future impact and contradiction of perceived successes.
Iran Coup d’état 1953
Operation TPAJAX The post-war period brought with it the fear of Communism to the United States. This belief was deeply ingrained in day-to-day life and the nation’s number one priority in regards to national security. In Iran, a plan to nationalize its oil industry brought about great concern with the British.(2) The British intelligence service (SIS) partnered with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to develop a plan to ensure continued control of oil interests in Iran and eradicate the movement to nationalize the oil industry. At this point in time, Great Britain had total
Cited: 2. John Prados, Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Ivan R. Dee, 2006), p99 3 14. John Prados, Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Ivan R. Dee, 2006), p121 15 27. John Prados, Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Ivan R. Dee, 2006), p204 28