TABLE OF CONTENTS
* Introduction 2 * Analysis 5 * Reasoning
This is a case regarding Delegated Legislation (Controls and Safeguards). Justice Krishna Iyer rightly stated that Parliamentary control over delegated legislation should be a living continuity as a constitutional necessity. So as to the control of the legislature over delegated legislation, Jain and Jain stated: “In a parliamentary democracy it is the function of the Legislature to legislate. If it seeks to delegate its power to the Executive because of some reasons, it is not only the right of the Legislature, but also its obligation, as principal, to see how its agent i.e. the Executive carries out the agency entrusted to it. Since it is the legislature which grants legislative power to the Administration, it is primarily its responsibility to ensure the proper exercise of the delegated legislative power, to supervise and control the actual exercise of this power, and ensure against the danger of its objectionable, abusive and unwarranted use by the Administration.” It is of course open to the Parliament to confer legislative power upon anyone it likes, including the author of Administrative Law. But if Parliament delegates legislative powers to any other authority, e.g. to the Executive, it must also ensure that those powers are properly exercised by the administration and there is no misuse of authority by the executive. Since the risk of abuse of power by the executive is inherent in the process of delegated legislation, it is necessary for the legislature to keep an eye on the delegate. This is much more important in view of the fact that judicial control over the delegated legislation is not sufficient enough to keep administrative agencies within the bounds of delegation and there is need and necessity and ‘political’ control in terms of policy, which Parliament may be able to exercise efficiently. The underlying object of parliamentary control is to keep watch over the rule-making authorities and also to provide an opportunity to criticize them if there is abuse of power on their part.This mechanism is described as ‘Legislative veto’. In this case the appellants were Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd. The appellants had acquired iron sheets of prime quality at a rate higher than fixed by the Iron and Steel Controller in the exercise of their power vested in him under clause 15(1) of the Iron and Steel (Control) Order, 1956. Offence under Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955(Act no. 10 of 1955) was committed. The Special Magistrate had framed charges and secured in the court of Special Magistrate, Ambala Cantt. Charges were also framed for an offence under Section 7 of the Act read with clause 15(3) of the Control order. After the examination of sixteen witnesses, the appellants made an application before the Special Magistrate on February 12, 1970 under Section 251A(11) and 288(1) of the CrPC, 1898 praying that in view of the submissions made therein, the case against should not be proceeded and they shall be acquitted. The Trial Magistrate dismissed the application in his order dated June 4, 1970. The appellant contented that the notification fixing the maximum selling prices of the categories of Iron and Steel including the commodity in question had not been placed before both the Houses of Parliament, but the respondents in response to this contention said that the notification fixing the maximum selling prices of various categories of iron and steel including the black plain iron sheets being a part of the Control Order and a piece of delegated legislation, it was not necessary to...
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