Comparison of the 1938 Munich Crisis and 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and the Role of Nuclear Arms
Comparison of the 1938 Munich Crisis and 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and the Role of Nuclear Arms
Introduction
In annals of the 20th century, the Munich crisis of 1938 and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 are two of the more riveting examples of crisis diplomacy (Richardson 1994). Comparisons of the two cases yield a robust discourse on their similarities and differences. The two cases illustrate the complexity of international leadership through ‘summit diplomacy’ (Dobbs 2008; Faber 2008; Reynolds 2008).
The outcomes of the two historic events are vastly different. For instance, the Munich crisis eventually became a prelude to World War II that dragged Great Britain to war with Germany. The Cuban Missile Crisis turned out to be a finale to what could have been a catastrophic nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
In both cases, protagonists were influenced by the particular events, their domestic and geo-political state of affairs and the signals delivered and counter offers made from parties involved. This essay analyses the scenario, role of actors, and description of the outcomes of the two crises. The paper argues that the advent of the nuclear age, following World War II in 1945, shaped contemporary international relations. What makes the Cuban Missile Crisis fundamentally different was precisely because it occurred during nuclear age. This essay will outline some of the concepts such as deterrence, mutual assured destruction doctrine, and the concept of balance of terror to justify why the nuclear age has shaped events after World War II. The essay concludes by affirming the need to rethink and revisit the role of nuclear weapons in the 21st century.
Comparison of the Munich Crisis and Cuban Missile Crisis:
State of Affairs, Key Actors and Outcomes
The following paragraphs summarize the state of affairs, roles of key actors, and the outcomes of the Munich Crisis of 1938 and the Cuban
Introduction
In annals of the 20th century, the Munich crisis of 1938 and the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 are two of the more riveting examples of crisis diplomacy (Richardson 1994). Comparisons of the two cases yield a robust discourse on their similarities and differences. The two cases illustrate the complexity of international leadership through ‘summit diplomacy’ (Dobbs 2008; Faber 2008; Reynolds 2008).
The outcomes of the two historic events are vastly different. For instance, the Munich crisis eventually became a prelude to World War II that dragged Great Britain to war with Germany. The Cuban Missile Crisis turned out to be a finale to what could have been a catastrophic nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
In both cases, protagonists were influenced by the particular events, their domestic and geo-political state of affairs and the signals delivered and counter offers made from parties involved. This essay analyses the scenario, role of actors, and description of the outcomes of the two crises. The paper argues that the advent of the nuclear age, following World War II in 1945, shaped contemporary international relations. What makes the Cuban Missile Crisis fundamentally different was precisely because it occurred during nuclear age. This essay will outline some of the concepts such as deterrence, mutual assured destruction doctrine, and the concept of balance of terror to justify why the nuclear age has shaped events after World War II. The essay concludes by affirming the need to rethink and revisit the role of nuclear weapons in the 21st century.
Comparison of the Munich Crisis and Cuban Missile Crisis:
State of Affairs, Key Actors and Outcomes
The following paragraphs summarize the state of affairs, roles of key actors, and the outcomes of the Munich Crisis of 1938 and the Cuban
References: Allison, G and Zelikow, P. (1999) Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, New York: Longman. Buchanan, P. (2008) An Amicus Brief for Neville, http://www.creators.com/opinion/pat-buchanan/an-amicus-brief-for-neville.html . Date accessed 10/5/10. Dobbs, M. (2008) One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War, New York: Alfred A, Knopf. Faber, D. (2008) Munich: The 1938 Appeasement Crisis, New York: Simon & Schuster. Johnson, D. (2004) Overconfidence and War: The Havoc and Glory of Positive Illusions, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Reynolds, D. (2008) Summits: Six Meetings that Shaped the Twentieth Century, London: Penguin. Sokolski, H. (2004) Getting Mad: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, It’s Origins and Practice, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute. Waltz, K. (1979 Theory of International Politics, Random House USA Inc. Watt, D. (1989) How War Came: The Immediate Origins of the Second World War 1938-1939, New York: Pantheon Books. [ 4 ]. Barack Obama, Remarks at the opening plenary session of the Nuclear Security Summit, speech delivered at the opening session of the Nuclear Security Summit, Washington Convention Center, Washington, D.C., 13 April 2010, Viewed on 5 May, 2010,