Challenger Disaster Essay

Key weakness in decision-making

There are three key groups of people involved in the launch of Challenger: the Engineers and managers at Thiokol directly responsible for the launch and NASA officials who signed off on the launch. The key weaknesses in the decision making of Challenger disaster are a combination of contributing pluralist approach in the organizational structure, corporate culture, managerial habits, and failure of both engineers and management to practice ethical responsibilities.

NASA’s goals to launch a certain number of flights per year and to launch them on time had developed pressure for the individuals at NASA. This launch pressure had led the project manager of NASA, Lawrence Mulloy to comment on Thiokol engineers’ objections to Challenger launch, “My God, Thiokol, when do you want me to launch, next April?” Hence, the external pressures were internalized as NASA’s organization goals, directing the attention on individual decision and leading to the catastrophic disaster.
In the nature of pluralistic approach, the organization is viewed as competing sub-groups with their own
Thiokol engineers succeeded initially in convincing their managers, however they did not have a collective sense that the launch should not occur. The engineer Senior Vice President Jerry Mason final called for a ‘management’ decision to be made during an offline discussion among Thiokol engineers and managers. Mason told Vice President of Engineering Robert Lund, “It’s time to take off your engineering hat and put on your management hat.” Despite the full knowledge of the flawed design and uncertainty launching in temperatures below 30 degrees Fahrenheit, Lund did not support his ethical protest and capitulated. Similarly, Jerry Mason had failed to carry out ethical duty to safeguard life as he prioritized the profits of the company and his own