British Threats To Iraq

Britain dealt with numerous threats to its interests in Egypt and Iraq throughout the interwar period. A growing problem for British rule was the rise of nationalism, which impacted foreign policy as Britain sought to preserve its position. British interests in Iraq and Egypt included the security of the Suez Canal, oil reserves, easy access to India, as well as potential military bases. By retaliating violently to rebellion and making concessions to the nationalists, Britain was able to protect its interests with old Imperial values shifting into modern self-rule. For example, in Egypt Britain maintained control of Suez and protected the shipping of oil and continuation of trade throughout its empire. Similarly, military interests in Iraq
Refuelling posts in Iraq would provide an important link between Egypt and India and mean that the reliance on the Suez Canal was lessened, somewhat alleviating British pressures in Egypt. Additionally, military bases in Iraq would allow emergency troops to be deployed around the world swiftly. These factors made the security of Iraq’s oil reserves strategically important. Since the navy had switched to oil in 1911, use had risen from 270,000 tons a year to 900,000 tons in 1918 and so Britain acted to protect its stake in the reserves. The 1924 treaty attempted to bridge the gap between the British and the Iraqi nationalists by making concessions to the nationalists and alleviating British worries. The treaty was hugely successful for Britain, which could now position its military forces in Iraq, command local armies, and gain full access to the roads, railways and ports to enable swift mobilisation. The treaty also gave Britain control over the Iraqi army, reducing the threat of revolt. Therefore, British interests were successfully protected as bilateral treaties enabled it to make claims that otherwise would have been wholly
Britain managed to maintain its level of covert control despite this and so protected its interests and reduced expenses, believing ‘air control, backed with a few armoured cars’ was an ‘infinitely cheaper’ way to protect its interests. Although this cost efficiency was beneficial, it did not provide sufficient protection from invasion from the desert regions and was no use in heavily populated areas. This highlights the success of the treaties of 1924 and 1930 in ensuring Britain’s protection of military interests as they eliminated such threats. The 1930 Anglo-Iraqi treaty was configured to give Iraq control of its own domestic policy under British terms and acted as a distraction from the continuation of British control. For example, the British ambassador remained senior to any other ambassador in Baghdad. The treaty also allowed the full use of Iraq’s resources in the event of war. Britain was given two military bases and the authority to train and equip the Iraqi army. The result of this 25 year treaty for the British was reassurance that in war or when faced with a threat to India or elsewhere in the region, it would be able to respond quickly in defence of imperial interests. This also appeased Britain’s fear of appearing weak globally, and prevented other colonial countries spotting the decline of the empire