BMGT611
THE CHANGE PROCESS FOR
INTRODUCING THE SWIPE CARD Unions argued that the walkout was triggered by senior management at BA “abandoning talks over the introduction of smart cards and announcing their forced imposition at just five days’ notice.” 111
It was this unilateral decision by BA to introduce the swipe card, and a lack of adequate consultation with affected staff, that was cited as a key reason for the strike. 112 Even BA’s pilots, who did not oppose a check-in system, were said to be sympathetic
“with the . . . check-in staff over the way that the airline had mishandled the introduction of the swipe cards.” 113 One commentator labeled the change process as a “commercial disaster” serving as “an important warning—about the dangers of manage- ment by diktat, certainly, but, more profoundly, about an incipient revolt against the close control and monitoring of our lives and movements that modern information technology enables.” 114 The Economist argued that management’s “big mistake was to introduce a new working practice at the start of the summer quarter when the airline makes all its money.” 115 Similarly, The Times wrote that this was a major management blunder: “To pick July, the start of the peak holiday season, to launch an unpopular new clock-in system, is asking for trouble. To push through a scheme without real- izing the extent of the resistance by those involved suggests a management aloof from the mood of its employees. And to allow managers to give con- tradictory statements on the use of the new cards seems guaranteed to foment mistrust.” 116 As Hutton argued, with 20,000 other BA workers using the swipe card system, “Imposing them after months of inconclusive talks must have seemed— especially given the pressure to contain costs, with the airline set to report its worst ever quarterly loss of
£60 million this week—a risk worth taking. It was a massive miscalculation
INTRODUCING THE SWIPE CARD Unions argued that the walkout was triggered by senior management at BA “abandoning talks over the introduction of smart cards and announcing their forced imposition at just five days’ notice.” 111
It was this unilateral decision by BA to introduce the swipe card, and a lack of adequate consultation with affected staff, that was cited as a key reason for the strike. 112 Even BA’s pilots, who did not oppose a check-in system, were said to be sympathetic
“with the . . . check-in staff over the way that the airline had mishandled the introduction of the swipe cards.” 113 One commentator labeled the change process as a “commercial disaster” serving as “an important warning—about the dangers of manage- ment by diktat, certainly, but, more profoundly, about an incipient revolt against the close control and monitoring of our lives and movements that modern information technology enables.” 114 The Economist argued that management’s “big mistake was to introduce a new working practice at the start of the summer quarter when the airline makes all its money.” 115 Similarly, The Times wrote that this was a major management blunder: “To pick July, the start of the peak holiday season, to launch an unpopular new clock-in system, is asking for trouble. To push through a scheme without real- izing the extent of the resistance by those involved suggests a management aloof from the mood of its employees. And to allow managers to give con- tradictory statements on the use of the new cards seems guaranteed to foment mistrust.” 116 As Hutton argued, with 20,000 other BA workers using the swipe card system, “Imposing them after months of inconclusive talks must have seemed— especially given the pressure to contain costs, with the airline set to report its worst ever quarterly loss of
£60 million this week—a risk worth taking. It was a massive miscalculation