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International Research Journal of Finance and Economics ISSN 1450-2887 Issue 84 (2012) © Euro Journals Publishing, Inc. 2012 http://www.internationalresearchjournaloffinanceandeconomics.com

Impact of Ownership Structure on Firm Performance Evidence from Non-Financial Listed Companies at Karachi Stock Exchange
Khalil-Ur-Rehman Wahla Faculty of Management Sciences International Islamic University, Islamabad E-mail: khalilwahla@gmail.com Tel: +92-333-6334293 Syed Zulfiqar Ali Shah Faculty of Management Sciences International Islamic University, Islamabad E-mail: zulfiqar.shah@gmail.com Tel: +92-51-9019764 Zahid Hussain Department of Business Administration National Textile University Faisalabad E-mail: zahid@ntu.edu.pk Tel: +92-41-9230081 Ext: 169 Abstract This study is conducted to analyze the significant relationship of Ownership Structure with Firm Performance in non-financial companies listed at Karachi Stock Exchange during the period 2008 to 2010. Ownership Structure is represented by Managerial Ownership and Concentrated Ownership. Tobin’s Q is used as a proxy for Firm Performance. Panel Data Technique has employed to foresee the significant relationship among the variables. Results showed that Managerial Ownership has a significant negative relationship with Firm Performance, whereas Concentrated Ownership has shown insignificant relationship with Firm Performance. Leverage, a controlled variable has shown a significant negative relationship with Firm performance while insignificant relationship found between Assets Turnover and Firm Performance. Our results suggested that Firm Performance critically depends on Managerial Ownership. Agency problems arise due to increase in Managerial Shareholdings in Pakistani context, which ultimately impacts the performance of the firms. Keywords: Karachi Stock Exchange, Ownership Structure, Firm Performance

International Research Journal of Finance and Economics – Issue 84 (2012)

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1. Introduction
The



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