Arguments Against Endurantist Essay

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Against Objects
In arguing against the endurantist’s theory of reality—that is, the idea that objects are wholly present and only present in the ‘now’—a bold conclusion is made: that the endurantist contradicts himself in believing an object that has changed is identical to itself in a time before it had changed. The argument is this: endurantists believe that every object is numerically identical to (is the same as) itself at every point in time during its ‘object-hood’ or lifespan. For example, a piano is the same object now as it will be ten years from now. However, if this is true, then it is also true that an object is numerically identical to itself minus a particular part of itself, regardless of the time at which the object is compared to itself—imagine the piano with a missing key. Fair enough, says the anti-endurantist, but if an object is numerically identical to itself, then it must possess all the same properties at both of the points in time being compared. However, an object lacking a part of itself would necessarily
Therefore, if we really want to make such an argument against the endurantist, we must look down to the most basic, indivisible parts that cannot be liberally assigned a nickname, since only they are truly objects: the piano has a limited lifespan, but the matter that makes it up is eternally present, both before and after the lifespan of the superficial thing we call “The