Why Locke Is Such an Agressive Critique of Hobbes' Leviathan Idea

A POSSIBLE EXPLANATION WHY JOHN LOCKE IS SUCH AN AGGRESSIVE CRITIQUE OF THOMAS HOBBES’ LEVIATHAN IDEA

Introduction
Writing in the 1650’s, Thomas Hobbes sought to address the prevalent problem of war by seeking to obtain those rational principles that will aid the construction of a “civil polity that will not be subject to destruction from within. ” Hobbes employs the idea of a “social contract” to resolve that seemingly intractable problem of war and disorder. He begins by imagining how people were in their natural condition i.e. before the emergence of a civil society. According to Hobbes, in that natural condition all men are equal and all possess the power of rationality. However, they are also “fundamentally selfish each person’s desires are for his (or her) own survival and reproduction.”
As people increase in number, they will start competing for resources, glory and love and since in that condition there is no law to put into check human behavior, there will inevitably emerge a state of war. As Hobbes puts it, “…during that time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against every man.” The remedy of such a situation is only possible because all people possess rationality which, as Hobbes argues, will necessarily lead them to “create a government run by a sovereign holding absolute power, because only absolute power is sufficient to resolve disputes that otherwise would precipitate conflict dissolving the commonwealth and threatening the lives of all.” Put simply, Hobbes’ Leviathan theory contends that the state should have absolute power and no one should be able to overthrow it. It took forty years and the person of John Locke, in his Second Treatise of Government, to point out the grave problems presented by the Leviathan Idea. Locke’s scathing attack on the Leviathan idea takes a two-fold approach. Firstly, it addresses what Locke sees as an incorrect description by Hobbes of men and women in their natural condition. To Locke, what Hobbes describes is actually the ‘state of war’, a condition different from the ‘state of war’. Secondly, and this is the gist of his critique, he argues against an absolute state on two main reasons. Since, according to Locke human beings do not have absolute power; they cannot give what they don’t have to the state. And the possession of absolute power by the state will deny men and women their property yet the preservation of property is the reason for them to form a civil society. This paper explores each of the above-mentioned lines of criticisms by Locke on Hobbes’ Leviathan Idea as a possible explanation to why Locke is such an aggressive critique of the Leviathan idea.

The “state of nature/natural condition” is not necessarily a “state of war” Hobbes apparently unproportionately mixes two different conditions which blend into what many commentaries term an overly pessimistic view of the nature of human beings. Locke makes a clear distinction between these two ‘states’. Unlike Hobbes, Locke views the natural condition as a “state of Peace, Goodwill, Mutual Assistance, and Preservation… (wherein people live together) according to reason, without a common Superior on Earth, with Authority to judge between them.” This condition differs from that of Hobbes in the sense that it implicitly argues for the upper role that reason takes in governing people’s behaviors while subordinating self-interest and passions. It is a “State of perfect Freedom (of men and women) to order their Actions and dispose of their Possessions, and Persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the Law of Nature…” This law of nature forbids anyone from destroying himself/herself or any other person for that matter, “when his (or her) own preservation comes not in competition” and requires everyone to do as much as they can to “preserve the rest of mankind” Locke sharply contrasts this ‘state of nature’ with a ‘state of war’. He describes the ‘state of war’ as “a state of Enmity, Malice, Violence, and Mutual Destruction.” This description corresponds to Hobbes’ view of the natural condition.

Against absolute power of the state From Hobbes’ conception of life in the natural condition as I have illustrated in the introduction, Hobbes comes to the conclusion that the only way that people can save themselves is by abandoning that condition and getting into a society in such a manner as if each individual was to say to another “I Authorize and give up my Right of Governing my selfe, to this Man (or woman), or to this Assembly of men (and/or women), on this condition, that thou give up thy Right to him (or her), and Authorize all his Actions in like manner.” By entering into society through this giving up of one’s rights, two implications necessarily follow. “Not only do the members of the multitude have no remaining right to question the actions of their sovereign; they have a positive duty to own whatever actions their sovereign may undertake in seeking their safety and contentment.” Hobbes tries to use his account of attributed action to argue that whatever the sovereign will do, will be in the best interest of his/her subjects. Attributed action here means that the acts of the Leviathan are actually nothing other than the acts of individual members of the multitude . Locke fiercely opposes this simplistic way of thinking. First, he argues that men and women in their natural condition do not have absolute power and so they are in no position to give it to the state. Locke argues from the common sense principle that no one can give what he or she has not. Human beings by their very nature do not have absolute power and therefore even if all men and women were to surrender all their power to the state, still it is not logically conceivable that the state will possess absolute power. Regarding the power of the Leviathan, Locke articulates, “…it can be no more than those persons had in a State of Nature before they entered into Society, and gave up to the Community. For no Body can transfer to another more power than he (or she) has in himself (or herself); and no Body has an absolute Arbitrary Power over himself (or herself) or over any other…”
.Secondly, Locke argues that allowing the sovereign to have absolute arbitrary power will cause more harm that good in case the sovereign turns against the people. Locke observes that the state still is made up of the same men and women who come from the state of nature. This means that those who make up the state are self-interested like everybody else. Giving them absolute power is very dangerous since in case they turn against their subjects no one will be able to stop them. In this light, Locke concludes that even the state of nature with its own ‘inconveniences’ would be a much better condition to live in that in Hobbes’ commonwealth. He gives his reason that whereas in the ‘state of nature’ everyone was at liberty to defend their rights against aggressors, in the absolute state they are defenseless and vulnerable to any injury that the state chooses to inflict upon them. Entering into an absolute state is as if people “were to put themselves into a worse condition than the state of Nature, wherein they had a Liberty to defend their Right against the Injuries of others…(and) have disarmed themselves, and armed him (or her i.e. the state) to make a prey of them when he (or she) pleases.” To Locke, this is unacceptable and so he proposes that the state should be identified with law rather than might as in Hobbes’ case. The law should be above the state so as to keep the state in check. In addition, Locke asserts “…the right of people to resist their rulers when they they are misruled by them.” Locke advocates that any government should rule by consent. If the end of the government is not met (i.e. the preservation of individual’s property) and the property owners are left miserable, not just once but over a long period, then the people are at liberty to overthrow the government and form a new one as they think fit.

Bibliography

1. Hampton, J., ‘Thomas Hobbes’, [in] Classics of Political and Moral Philosophy, Cahn, S. M., (ed.), New York: Oxford University Press, 2002

2. Hobbes, T., Leviathan, London: Penguin Books, 1985.

3. Lloyd, S.A., and Susanne S., "Hobbes 's Moral and Political Philosophy”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2009 Edition), [online] Zalta, E. N., (ed.), Available from: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/hobbes-moral/ (accessed on 23rd April, 2009)

4. Locke, J., Second Treatise of Government, Macpherson, C. B., (ed.), Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1980.

5. Locke, J., Two Treatises of Government, Laslett, P., (ed.), New York: Cambridge University Press, 1960

6. Skinner, Q., Visions of Politics Volume III: Hobbes and Civil Science, UK: Cambridge University Press

7. Stevenson, L., ed., The Study of Human Nature, New York: Oxford University Press, 2000

8. Tuckness, A., "Locke 's Political Philosophy", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), [online], Zalta, E. N (ed.), Available from: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/locke-political/ (accessed on 23rd April, 2009).

Bibliography: 1. Hampton, J., ‘Thomas Hobbes’, [in] Classics of Political and Moral Philosophy, Cahn, S. M., (ed.), New York: Oxford University Press, 2002 2. Hobbes, T., Leviathan, London: Penguin Books, 1985. 3. Lloyd, S.A., and Susanne S., "Hobbes 's Moral and Political Philosophy”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2009 Edition), [online] Zalta, E. N., (ed.), Available from: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/hobbes-moral/ (accessed on 23rd April, 2009) 4. Locke, J., Second Treatise of Government, Macpherson, C. B., (ed.), Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1980. 5. Locke, J., Two Treatises of Government, Laslett, P., (ed.), New York: Cambridge University Press, 1960 6. Skinner, Q., Visions of Politics Volume III: Hobbes and Civil Science, UK: Cambridge University Press 7. Stevenson, L., ed., The Study of Human Nature, New York: Oxford University Press, 2000 8. Tuckness, A., "Locke 's Political Philosophy", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), [online], Zalta, E. N (ed.), Available from: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/locke-political/ (accessed on 23rd April, 2009).