The Subjectivity Of Values, By Stevenson, And J. L. Mackie

Contemporary philosophers such as, G.E. Moore, C.L. Stevenson, and J.L. Mackie, all have theories that develop different views concerning the status of moral judgments and the existence of moral facts. Moore, in his, Subject Matter of Ethics, argued that moral facts do exist and can be true or false but must be indescribable. Stevenson, in his, The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms, disagreed with Moore and said that moral judgements can’t be true or false they simply can inspire certain feelings of approval or disapproval in humans. Mackie, in his, The Subjectivity of Values, would disagree with both and say that there are no moral facts and that all moral judgments are simply wrong. It seems to be the case, on soundness alone, that Moore has
To understand why Stevenson thinks this it must be stated how he defines good. Stevenson first thinks in order for something to be good it must fit a certain “vital” set of criteria. He lays out three criteria that good must fulfil and that is to, “be able to disagree intelligently about whether something is good. Goodness must have, so to speak, a magnetism and it must not be discoverable solely through the scientific method.” He feels that all previous interest theories fail to satisfy these three rationally deduced principals. Stevenson’s attempt to satisfy these three criteria for good is that ethical statements aren’t trying to indicate facts but to create influences. He can be interpreted to mean that the purpose of ethical statements is to change or intensify people’s feelings or sentiments, he calls this the emotive value of words. . He states that clearly here, “When you tell a man that he oughtn’t steal, your object isn’t merely to let him know that most, or some, people disapprove of stealing you are attempting rather to get him to disapprove of it.” He firmly asserts that ethical judgements are mere attempts at swaying people’s feelings about actions or rather getting them to realize the emotive feelings that you have. Stevenson argues that, “….In leaving out the emotive meaning of words, (interest theories) give the impression that ethical judgments are used descriptively only, and of course when judgments are used descriptively only; the only disagreement can arise are disagreements in belief specifically beliefs in interest not about interest.” He then asserts that no other disagreement necessarily exist. He can be interpreted to mean that ethical statements are not wrong or right but merely disagreements about interest which is solved by whichever party is more persuasive in