The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers Author(s): Richard Roll Source: The Journal of Business, Vol. 59, No. 2, Part 1 (Apr., 1986), pp. 197-216 Published by: The University of Chicago Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2353017 Accessed: 10/02/2010 10:10 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ucpress. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact firstname.lastname@example.org.
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The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers*
Finally, knowledge of the source of takeover gains still eludes us. [Jensen and Ruback 1983, p. 47] I. Introduction
Despite many excellent research papers, we still do not fully understandthe motives behindmergers and tender offers or whether they bring an increase in aggregatemarketvalue. In their comprehensive review article (from which the above quote is taken), Jensen and Ruback (1983) summarize the empiricalwork presented in over 40 * The earlierdraftsof this paperelicited manycomments. It is a pleasureto acknowledgethe benefitsderivedfrom the generosity of so many colleagues. They corrected several conceptualand substantiveerrors in the previous draft, directed my attentionto other results, and suggestedother interpretationsof the empiricalphenomena. In general, they provided me with an invaluable tutorial on the subject of corporatetakeovers.The presentdraftundoubtedly constill tainserrorsandomissions,but this is due mainlyto my inability to distill and convey the collective knowledgeof the profession. Among those who helped were C. R. Alexander, Peter Bernstein, Thomas Copeland, Harry DeAngelo, EugeneFama, KarenFarkas,MichaelFirth, MarkGrinblatt, Gregg Jarrell, Bruce Lehmann, Paul Malatesta, Ronald Masulis, David Mayers, John McConnell, Merton Miller, StephenRoss, RichardRuback,SheridanTitman,and, especially, MichaelJensen, KatherineSchipper,WalterA. Smith, Jr., and J. Fred Weston. I also benefitedfrom the comments of the finance workshop participantsat the University of Chicago, the University of Michigan, and DartmouthCollege, and of the referees. (Journal of Business, 1986, vol. 59, no. 2, pt. 1) ? 1986 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 002 1-9398/86/5902-0001$01.50 197
The hubris hypothesis is advanced as an explanation of corporate takeovers. Hubris on the part of individual decision makers in bidding firms can explain why bids are made even when a valuation above the current market price represents a positive valuation error. Bidding firms infected by hubris simply pay too much for their targets. The empirical evidence in mergers and tender offers is reconsidered in the hubris context. It is argued that the evidence supports the hubris hypothesis as much as it supports other explanations such as taxes, synergy, and inefficient target management.
References: Asquith, P. 1983. Merger bids, uncertainty, and stockholder returns. Journal of Financial Economics 11 (April): 51-83. by saying, I think we are justified in doubting .. . the argument that mergers are done to maximize stockholder wealth." Foster (1983) seems to share this view or at least the view that bidders make big mistakes. Larcker (1983) presents interesting results that managers in large takeovers are more likely to have short-term, accounting-based compensation contracts. He finds that, the more accounting-based the compensation, the more negative is the market price reaction to a bid. Larcker also suggests that managers who own less stock in their own company are more likely to make bids.
Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers
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Journal of Business
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