Zombie Theory

“Do Zombies show that the mind cannot be physical?”

To say that the mind is physical would be to reduce the mind and all it includes down to its physical properties. The mind, in this sense, would be the brain, as this scenario presents the mind and brain as one in the same. However, with the introduction of the so-called “Zombie Theory” comes the inevitable question of what it shows. I believe that by their very premise the hypothetical existence of Zombies in the philosophical sense very much shows that the mind cannot be physical. In saying that, there are some very good arguments for the presence of Zombies whilst still maintaining a physicalists’ stance. Such arguments state that a Zombie world could be possible, but there are properties
It is possible that physicalists are able to acknowledge that the possibility of a Zombie world – that is, a world identical to ours in purely physical respects – are possible, but there are properties that “block” consciousness from occurring in these worlds (Chalmers 2010, 163 – 165). In this case, physicalists are able to agree that the possibility of these zombie worlds is indeed possible (Lauenberger 2008). I find fault in this approach to the subject matter, however, as in the scenario as it is not consistent with the physicalist view that conscious or mental states are identical to that of ones physical state. If physicalists are to present the idea of a “consciousness blocker” it needs to be in a way that is consist in regards to the rest of their beliefs.

Nevertheless, I raise the question of impossibility. Physicalists are not able to merely ascertain that zombies are impossible due to the laws of nature due to the stance of dualists that the physical facts that bring consciousness are brought by nomonological necessity. That is, the physical facts that bring consciousness are neither logically necessary nor theoretically explicable, but just are. As such, physicalists need something more tangible in order to maintain their
The connection from physical facts to consciousness is believed to be illogical, and the conceptual structure of physics does not appear to enable logical links between the physical and the phenomenal (Kriegel 2011; Stoljar 2006). Zombies are not really conceivable (Kirk 2013, Tye 2006). Kirk also states that although the physical facts do not require the truths about conscious experience a priori, they do require them by logical necessity. Physicalists maintain that metaphysical necessity ensure the impossibility of the zombie theory, maintaining that states of phenominal consciousness are identical with physical states. This is a typical stance on the subject and is argued by Kripke who states that these identities are necessary.

If the physical facts demand consciousness by metaphysical necessity, it is possible for physicalists to maintain that despite being impossible, philosophical Zombies are conceivable (Balog 2012; Sturgeon 2000). Conversely, Chalmers argues that conceivability entails metaphysical possibility. This would mean a popular brand of physicalism is mistaken and the so-called “conceivability argument” for the Zombie theory will provide a focus for raising and discussing the main problems of the