What Is a Reactive Attitude? What Bearing Does It Have on the Problem of Free Will?
What is a reactive attitude? What bearing does it have on the problem of free will?
A theory that has attacked the validity of discussions on freedom in modern philosophy is determinism. In these discussions, questions have arisen as to how the truth or falsity of this theory should affect our lives. In this essay I will discuss the formal implications, illustrated by Peter Strawson, that come about from this. This will mean discussion of our reactive attitudes on: our moral considerations and on our inter-personal relationships with others in general. With this in mind, I will argue in favour of the idea that the truth or falsity of determinism is not of legitimate concern to those seeking a rational justification of our moral practices and inter-personal relationships. Furthermore, I will give further details about how we actually do justify our reactive attitudes on these two ideas in order to better illustrate what we can consider as alternative features affecting our moral considerations and inter-personal relationships.
To begin with, Strawson reviews two main positions on which to size up the threat of determinism on the notion of freedom. Firstly, the optimists, who believe that the truth of determinism is compatible with our moral practices as well as our inter-personal relationships, secondly, the pessimists who believe that the truth of determinism runs contrary to these two practices. To explain why the theory of determinism should be considered to have such an influential impact, Strawson writes that the pessimists argue:
“Just punishment and moral condemnation imply moral guilt and guilt implies moral responsibility and moral responsibility implies freedom and freedom implies the falsity of determinism.”
If this is the case, that determinism is found to be true, and our behaviour is causally governed, then our justifications for moral practices are unfounded. Despite this, what also needs to be considered is whether or not the truth of
A theory that has attacked the validity of discussions on freedom in modern philosophy is determinism. In these discussions, questions have arisen as to how the truth or falsity of this theory should affect our lives. In this essay I will discuss the formal implications, illustrated by Peter Strawson, that come about from this. This will mean discussion of our reactive attitudes on: our moral considerations and on our inter-personal relationships with others in general. With this in mind, I will argue in favour of the idea that the truth or falsity of determinism is not of legitimate concern to those seeking a rational justification of our moral practices and inter-personal relationships. Furthermore, I will give further details about how we actually do justify our reactive attitudes on these two ideas in order to better illustrate what we can consider as alternative features affecting our moral considerations and inter-personal relationships.
To begin with, Strawson reviews two main positions on which to size up the threat of determinism on the notion of freedom. Firstly, the optimists, who believe that the truth of determinism is compatible with our moral practices as well as our inter-personal relationships, secondly, the pessimists who believe that the truth of determinism runs contrary to these two practices. To explain why the theory of determinism should be considered to have such an influential impact, Strawson writes that the pessimists argue:
“Just punishment and moral condemnation imply moral guilt and guilt implies moral responsibility and moral responsibility implies freedom and freedom implies the falsity of determinism.”
If this is the case, that determinism is found to be true, and our behaviour is causally governed, then our justifications for moral practices are unfounded. Despite this, what also needs to be considered is whether or not the truth of