To What Extent Did Weimar Germany Experience A Period Of Economic and Political Deceptive Stability In the Years 1924-1929?

To What Extent Did Weimar Germany Experience A Period Of Economic and Political Deceptive Stability In the Years 1924-1929?

During the years 1924-1929, despite small, short-term economic progress being made with some political stability, it is evident that Germany was, as stated by Stresemann, ‘dancing on the edge of a volcano’ in the respect that any stability experienced was only short lived, and only the calm before the storm of the economic crisis in 1929, and suggesting it to therefore be deceptive and not necessarily genuine.

On the surface, during the period it is clear that Weimar Germany experienced a degree of economic stability. By 1924, heavy industry exports had increased by 40% due to the forming of big businesses, which made production more efficient, and the fact that coal output had reached pre-war levels also suggests that production standards were becoming more stable. In addition, a new German currency and the German Reichsbank had been introduced which increased economic stability as it made Germany more attractive to foreign loans and investments which would make up for the reparations that were being lost. However, due to fluctuating population levels, there were more young people than elderly and an insufficient amount of jobs. The instability caused by this is shown from the fact that unemployment never fell below 1.3 million, and the German public were, at that time, discouraged from saving their money, and the Government were overspending with, many of the foreign loans being spent on welfare benefits, and so suggests that the German economy was unstable due to the fact that it was unable to fully recover from the debts of the First World War.

Furthermore, the pivotal factor that made the German economy so unstable, and that indicates incomplete economic recovery, was the fact that they were fully dependent on foreign loans. Although, due to the Young Plan of 1929, they had been given an extension on paying back their loans, this was pivotal as it meant that they had no control over their economy and if something happened to the global or American economy, for example the Wall Street Crash, they would not be able to save themselves. This shows that Germany had not experienced genuine economic recovery and it was in a period of deceptive stability due to the fact that it was not unable to support itself and so was built on a foundation of false security, which was not a solid base for stable future economic growth as it was dependent on foreign loans and investments.

However, this economic stability suggests a degree of political stability, as, without it, Germany would not have been able to attain foreign loans. This is shown from the Locarno Pact of 1925, which also brought stability due to the fact that it accepted the demilitarisation of the Rhineland, which brought Germany out of isolation after the First World War, improving the stability of its international status as it improved French and German alliances. This is also shown from Germany joining the League of Nations in 1926, which made Germany more stable economically, due to the fact that it allowed them to trade with other countries whilst gaining foreign investments, and also politically as it regained acceptance from other countries that it had turned against during the war. Furthermore, with the SPD being the largest party in the Reichstag with 29% of the votes and the election of President Hindenburg as a conservative could be said to have brought stability as it meant that the two different parties could work together. However, this was not the case and at this moment in time suggests a period of looking stable externally with deceptive internal stability.

Hindenburg was not a supporter of the Weimar Republic and due to his conservative attitudes was not in favour of the Young Plan or the Policy of Fulfilment, suggesting instability due to the fact that he was a President who disagreed with his countries’ policies. This highlights a further divide in German politics making the country unstable, which was the fact that parties refused to form coalitions. The SPD’s refused to compromise on both social and foreign policy, such as the Policy of Fulfilment or budget reform, and so there was no possibility of them working together to form a coalition which made Germany unstable due to the fact that a parliamentary democracy could not be formed. Furthermore, the public were starting to lost interest and weren’t happy with the results of party policies and, during the period, election turnouts decreased with more people voting for fringe parties. Despite the NSDAP only receiving 2.6% of the vote, due to the slight rise in appeal for fringe parties, this suggests deceptive stability, as people were becoming unhappy with the work of the SPD and of the political system, and this small degree of change could be seen to be laying the foundations for future unrest.

In conclusion, despite the illusion of internal stability in the Weimar economy and political system, due to an increase in social welfare benefits and its seemingly improving international relations, it is clear that there were underlying tensions due to its reliance on foreign investments and parties’ disabilities to work together. This shows that, due to the fact that Germany experienced a period of coping rather than moving, recovery and stability were deceptive rather than genuine in the years 1924-1928.