The subjugation of the protesters provided an essential meaning to the CCP, they persevered. The rebellion was crushed, callously, despite expectations in the west that the government would collapse and a ‘serious chaotic state’ would appear, they remained. The reality that the government remained distinctly indicated an end to calls from pro-democrats to reorganise a rebellion. Gittings argues that ‘fear of national upheaval with historical memory of the rebellion within the past century remained,’ augmenting Bensons view that the ‘shadow of Tiananmen is unlikely to disappear.’ The remonstrations allowed the government to reassess the political guidance of Dengism, which had inadvertently legitimised the insurgence, as the government declared, ‘the incident taught us…we see more clearly.’ It indicated the importance of protecting economic development besides national sovereignty. The ‘arguably’ unruly conduct of the government illustrated they were seldom tolerating a political mutiny to arise. Source 5 concludes with this line of argument that the government would have done all that was necessary to suppress the protests for the sake of socio-economic and political stability. Source 11 corresponds to this point, detailing the need in stopping the protests by stating the urgency of repressing it as to ensure administrative well-being and prevent defeat of the socialist system. Furthermore, as Benson referenced, concurring with Source 11, it most importantly prevented a seemingly inevitable, and potentially disastrous civil war emerging within China. Therefore it enlightened the quantity of political deliberation that needed to be reinvested into the economic structure, foremost the authoritative return of Maoism. The remonstrations ‘enabled the government to correct and develop’ the system where it was most flawed, as Gray argues, for instance, it provided the government with a robust need for increasing censorship and expurgation, which could now be legitimised on the grounds for political solidarity. The rebellion theoretically, albeit temporarily, forced Deng out, but in turn permitted him to re-evaluate his once regressive policies that had sanctioned the political freedom necessary to authenticate the protests. By this, critically, it is possible to argue that Tiananmen exposed the frailties of the current state and system. As a result, and in reference to the question, the new-fangled reforms drastically revived socio-economic and political stability, productively reinvigorating the system into, what is, today the biggest economic structure. As Fenby states in reference to the aftermath, ‘subsequently; politically, socially, culturally and economically, it turned out in China’s favour.’
Following the events of June 4th 1989, China experienced an overwhelmingly derogative global reaction as a result of the media’s coverage; western perspective of China became malformed for many years. The administrations immoral clamp down of political dissidents, who were rallying for radical political change, was broadcast worldwide; ‘the whole spectacle was being relayed to a horrified world by direct satellite television. (Source 7).’ Swiftly both the US and EEC publicly distanced themselves from Deng’s government, announcing a ‘ discontinuation of military personnel and suspension of political and trade visits. (Source 3)’ Conversely, it is interesting to note that despite the US swiftly, but more significantly, publicly condemning the massacre, diplomatic relations and negotiations continued behind the public war of words, in short, a private affiliation continued. A national archive prolongs this point, ‘ the US embarked on a secret mission to Beijing that was designed to maintain the lines of communication, stressing that both sides should take a long term view of the military relationship.’ Foreign powers highlighted the importance of ‘good relations’ with China, but also that the Tiananmen incident was an ‘internal...
Please join StudyMode to read the full document