The Second Night Body Theory

In “The Second Night”, Sam attempts to object Gretchen’s theory, The Body Theory of Personal Identity, which states that two beings are the same person as long as their bodies are numerically identical. Sam’s first argument states that Gretchen’s argument violates the epistemic constraint of knowing which person is which on an everyday basis and thus the body theory is false.
1. If the Body theory is true, then this morning I’m the same person I was yesterday only if I have the same body I did yesterday.
2. If I’m the same person I was yesterday only if I have the same body I had yesterday, then I can’t know I’m the same person without observing my body.
3. I can know I’m the same person without observing my body.
4. The Body Theory is false.
It just as simple as believing that two bodies are numerically identical to know that it is the same person. Conversely, premise three challenges this belief.
A rationalization for premise three is that it is possible to know that we are the same person without having to look at our bodies. We are aware of our personal identity even before we open our eyes. We do not have to wake up and look in the mirror just to make sure that we are not someone else. Furthermore, Sam also makes an alternative argument in regards to why the Body Theory of Personal Identity is false.
Sam’s second objection to the Body Theory of Personal Identity is called the Argument from Impossibility. It states that it is possible to imagine waking up in a different body, like is suggested in Kafka’s Metamorphosis, and thus the body theory is false. Kafka’s Metamorphosis tells about a story of a man that one day wakes up to find that he has turned into a large insect but seemingly still able to remain the same person.
1. It is logically possible for you to wake up with a body that’s numerically distinct from the one you had when you went to