The Perplexed Mosses Maimonides Disposition Of God

In the Guide to the perplexed Mosses Maimonides posits the idea that God can only be described only through his effects. To support his argument, he analyzes the five ways in which a thing can be described.
The first way is through the use of a full definition of the subject. Here Maimonides asserts that in order for a subject to be given a definition there must first be previous causes that constitute the definition. In relation to God, this way proves to be incompatible. God is eternal, making it impossible for there to be something prior to him. Moving forward, he addresses the second way which is essentially, a contraction of the first way. Instead of using the full definition, this way only uses a piece of the definition to describe the
Maimonides describes four different types of quality that can be used to describe a subject: disposition, physical quality, passive quality, and quantity. Disposition is quality that is a manifested result of their choices of a subject (e.g. doctor, addict, priest). Physical qualities are established by the subject’s physical properties (e.g. firm, coarse, soft). Passive qualities are qualities are the result of external forces (e.g. emotion, temperature, pain). Quantities are qualities which measure a subject’s shape (e.g. length, curve, degree). Although, these qualities are frequently used to describe subjects, they are all inadequate when describing God. All qualities are accidental and do not pertain to the essence of a subject. Though this is true, even if qualities did describe a subject’s essence, they would not aid men in describing God, since God cannot have any qualities ascribed to him. Qualities of disposition cannot be ascribed, due to Gods already eternal presence omnipotence and knowledge. Therefore, he has no choices to make or end to move towards. Physical qualities can’t be assigned either because God is immaterial not material. Passive qualities don’t work due to there being no external forces acting upon God. Lastly, due to Gods infinitude he cannot be
I have no quarrel with the first three ways; their logic is sound. The fourth way the however, causes me to hesitate. He argues that the material world cannot belong to the same class as God, and consequently the fourth way of description cannot be used. To an extent I can see his point, but the formal distinction he makes between necessary and possible existence lacks weight when examined. How can something that exists out of necessity create something unnecessary? Wouldn’t anything created by something necessary also be included in the necessity of the original things existence? It could be that I’m just hung up on a semantic argument that holds necessity to be synonyms with determined. Even so, if he is wrong about there being an unbridgeable gap between necessary and possible existence, the door is then open for description through the use of analogy. Beyond this though, the reason I choose to do my reflection on this reading is that his arguments are quite sound. If what was said is true I have wasted quite a bit of time on attempting to gain some sort of logical understanding of the divine. Even more so, I am left with faith alone to answer my questions. However, there is hope. Many of the claims made by Maimonides are contingent upon descriptions held in classical theism, most importantly the idea