The Cold War Analysis

In The Cold War: A New History, Gaddis reinterprets the historical record of the conflict; his sixth chapter, “Actors,” focuses on the role that individuals played in the end of the struggle. Toward this aim, he discusses how both strengths and weaknesses of world leaders such as Reagan and Gorbachev had a profound impact on the international system during the late twentieth century. Gaddis’s consideration of “the importance and vulnerability of individuals in history. . .” extends the limits of the structural-realist philosophy through which he became known (Gaddis 2005, 123). He does not, however, abandon realism completely. Instead, Gaddis enriches his account of the Cold War by acknowledging the confluence of individual action and
Gaddis asserts that Reagan understood the stagnatic nature of détente within the framework of the Cold War, and that his concentrated effort to abandon the policy was successful due to his oratory skill (Gaddis 2005, 123). Reagan’s public focus on the transitory character of Communist political ideology dramatically shifted American perception of the conflict. His “Evil Empire” speech reminded his domestic audience of the Soviet leadership’s illegitimacy and reiterated the inferiority of the communist system (Gaddis 2005, 124). More importantly, Reagan’s introduction of the Strategic Defense Initiative questioned the concept of security through vulnerability; challenging the basis of SALT I and the existence of nuclear weapons entirely (Gaddis 2005, 125). Reagan’s individual maneuvering of the complex issues surrounding the Cold War garnered Gorbachev’s trust and exposed the failure of the Brezhnev Doctrine, leading to the conclusion of the conflict (Gaddis 2005, 128 &
In accordance with Gaddis’s arguments, the past provides many examples of actors who shaped the world around them through their character. Metternich’s role in the preservation of the Austrian state serves as one of the best examples of this influence. His organization of the Congress of Vienna and diplomatic skill resulted in the establishment of both the Holy Alliance and the Quadruple Alliance (Kissinger 1994, 85). Kissinger argues that systemic state-building trends weakened Austria during the nineteenth century, but that Metternich’s construction of the Congress system facilitated European peace and rejected power politics (Kissinger 1994, 85). Bismarck serves as another historical example of Gaddis’s individualist argument. Kissinger repeatedly credits the first unification of Germany to Bismarck’s personal political prowess (Kissinger 1994, 187). The decline of both Austria and Germany after the removal of Metternich and Bismarck provides evidence of their unique political