Tet Offensive Research Paper
There are a number of battles the United States has participated in over the past years. Of the many battles, the United States military branches won in a decisive manner. However, there is one particular battle that comes to mind in which the United States military as a whole failed to utilize the intelligence that was provided to ward off a surprise attack. The battle that comes to mind is the Tet Offensive. This battle took place in Vietnam in January 1968 between North Vietnam and the Viet Cong, against the allied forces of South Vietnam and the United States. This passage will explain that if the United States’ and South Vietnamese’s military commanders acted upon the intelligence that was received prior to the lunar New Year’s holiday,
…show more content…
“There was evidence in January that some attacks in the highlands might be conducted during the Tet holiday…it was evident that other attacks were imminent, and some targets had been identified” (Interim Report, 1968). Despite enemy security measures, communications intelligence was able to provide clear warning that attacks, probably on a larger scale than ever, were an immediate threat. There were U.S. and allied government officials felt that the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong lack the resources and means to pull of such an elaborate attack. Washington and Saigon expected attacks on some cities but they didn’t expect the offensive to affect the cities, the civilian command, control centers, radio stations and police headquarters as primary objectives. The general picture presented was an enemy unable to conduct an offensive of such scope and intensity. The main lesson learned during the Tet Offensive is to acknowledge the intelligence that is gathered from single source reporting. If General Westmoreland and other officers within the U.S. and South Vietnamese forces would have planned for the attack via HUMINT and Communications reporting, the outcome of the Tet Offensive would have been different. By not acknowledging the intelligence, indications and warnings of the enemy, it allows unsuspecting enemies to conduct spectacular attacks such as the Tet Offensive. Another lesson learned is to never underestimate your enemy. If you underestimate your enemy, you will not know the enemy’s capabilities until it actually occurrs. In the case of the Tet Offensive, The U.S. and South Vietnamese forces underestimated the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong and the U.S. and allied forces paid a heavy
“There was evidence in January that some attacks in the highlands might be conducted during the Tet holiday…it was evident that other attacks were imminent, and some targets had been identified” (Interim Report, 1968). Despite enemy security measures, communications intelligence was able to provide clear warning that attacks, probably on a larger scale than ever, were an immediate threat. There were U.S. and allied government officials felt that the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong lack the resources and means to pull of such an elaborate attack. Washington and Saigon expected attacks on some cities but they didn’t expect the offensive to affect the cities, the civilian command, control centers, radio stations and police headquarters as primary objectives. The general picture presented was an enemy unable to conduct an offensive of such scope and intensity. The main lesson learned during the Tet Offensive is to acknowledge the intelligence that is gathered from single source reporting. If General Westmoreland and other officers within the U.S. and South Vietnamese forces would have planned for the attack via HUMINT and Communications reporting, the outcome of the Tet Offensive would have been different. By not acknowledging the intelligence, indications and warnings of the enemy, it allows unsuspecting enemies to conduct spectacular attacks such as the Tet Offensive. Another lesson learned is to never underestimate your enemy. If you underestimate your enemy, you will not know the enemy’s capabilities until it actually occurrs. In the case of the Tet Offensive, The U.S. and South Vietnamese forces underestimated the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong and the U.S. and allied forces paid a heavy