Smart's Argument Of The Mind-Brain Identity Theory

When we remark that we are in pain, or that we are experiencing any other kind of sensation, what exactly are we talking about? What is it that formally exists and that our words refer to? Questions along these lines form one of the major points of contention for Philosophers of Mind. In this essay I will assess the claim that a type of mental state is identical to a type of physical state (also referred to as a ‘brain state’). This claim forms the main argument of the Mind-Brain Identity theory. In the history of philosophy this theory is accredited to U.T. Place and Herbert Feigl in the 1950s, replacing behavioralism for the most part and eventually being overtaken and modified by the arguments of functionalism which I will discuss later
His was a typically materialist view that by Occam’s razor it is much more believable that the laws of physics explain everything including consciousness, than the dualist position that they explain everything but consciousness. Feigl coined the term “nomological danglers” to refer to the supposed mental-physical correlations in the dualist view (Feigl, 1958. pp 144). They would dangle from the ‘net’ of physical science sticking out as highly implausible. Smart wants to refute the idea that mental states are merely ‘correlated’ with physical brain states. This ‘correlation’ would suggest, as he puts it, that “they are something ‘over and above’” (Smart, 1959). Since you cannot correlate something with itself, you must either accept the dualist position and deal with nomological danglers limiting your supposedly universal laws of physics, or accept that mental states are identical to physical
If we want a theory of mind that can explain mental states then it must be true for any organism, even a theoretical alien life form with a silicon-based physiology for example (Putnam, 2002). In answer to this problem Hilary Putnam proposed a new theory, Functionalism, which became the dominant view. Putnam proposed that a mental state “is a functional state of a whole organism” (Putnam, 2002). By this model “each type of mental state is a state consisting of a disposition to act in certain ways and to have certain mental states, given certain sensory inputs and certain mental states” (Block, 1980). I will not discuss functionalism in too great detail since at this point I am talking about another theory entirely to the central claim of this essay. Suffice to say it consists of a family of theories born out of the problems with the identity theory of