Singer's Argument On Moral Obligation

I, as a senior at Rutgers University, am one of hundreds of millions of people who could devote a substantial quantity of less money on things that do not boost any effectiveness but my own. For the equivalent quantity of money I spend on an iClicker, I could provide a family in Zimbabwe access to the basic necessities of life. Singer argues we have widespread obligations to the world's poor, but we can meet them without being deprived of all of our worldly assets and possessions. This essay aims to defend Singer's arguments that we, fitting a picture of absolute affluence, have a moral obligation to help those in poverty.
Singer's position on our moral obligation to aid the world's poor is characteristically frank and rests on three premises. The first premise states that ‘if we can prevent something bad without sacrificing something significant, we ought to do it.’ The second premise simply declares that ‘extreme poverty is bad’. Finally, the third premise claims that ‘there is some extreme poverty we can prevent without sacrificing anything of comparable moral significance.’ Ultimately, the sum of the premises’ yield the conclusion that ‘we ought to prevent some extreme poverty.’ The premises are wisely formulated; it’s put forth in a fashion that
But, the opposing view would argue basically that poverty is a consequence of defective distribution and that population containment through a triage policy, or any policy, is bad parenting and quite easily solvable. There is a overabundance of food to provide and support the world's population if more efficiently distributed and industrial advances are making this is more realistic and plausible. “Population growth is not a reason against giving aid but a reason for reconsidering the type of aid to give”(2011: