Realism, the Blueprint of International Relations
Realism, the Blueprint of International Relations
From the Clinton administration’s reluctance to acknowledge genocide in Rwanda to the United States’ unwillingness to intervene in Darfur, the evidence overwhelmingly shows that many states in the world conform to the realist ideology. Scott defines realism as a major theoretical approach to international relations emphasizing the competitive, conflict-ridden pursuit of power and security among states in world politics (Scott 62). Realist believe that states are in constant competition for power and that the balance of power is only brief, as states take actions to gain more power. The realism philosophy places great emphasis on relative gains of power and the power itself derives from natural, economic, and military sources.
Scott states that the absence of central government to establish order and wield power and authority establishes a fundamentally Hobbesian world in which the main players of world politics must rely on themselves and themselves alone to protect their interest and accomplish their goals (Scott 64) This excerpt explains the inconsistencies in the US foreign policy and its contradicting decisions to intervene in some case and not in other. For example, nearly 2 million people died in Darfur as a result of conflict between the Muslim government and rebels in the south of the country. However, the U.S. only assisted from a distance by sending $190 million in relief aid, pressing for multilateral U.N. denunciations, and sending Secretary of State Colin Powell to Darfur. The same could be said in the Rwanda genocide where Hutus killed roughly 800,000 Tutsi in a 100-day period because of a simple difference in ethnicity. The Clinton administration refrained itself from calling the incident a “genocide” because it did not want to commit any military power.
In both of these tragedies the U.S. refused direct intervention because doing so was not beneficial to our country. Dying in Darfur, an
From the Clinton administration’s reluctance to acknowledge genocide in Rwanda to the United States’ unwillingness to intervene in Darfur, the evidence overwhelmingly shows that many states in the world conform to the realist ideology. Scott defines realism as a major theoretical approach to international relations emphasizing the competitive, conflict-ridden pursuit of power and security among states in world politics (Scott 62). Realist believe that states are in constant competition for power and that the balance of power is only brief, as states take actions to gain more power. The realism philosophy places great emphasis on relative gains of power and the power itself derives from natural, economic, and military sources.
Scott states that the absence of central government to establish order and wield power and authority establishes a fundamentally Hobbesian world in which the main players of world politics must rely on themselves and themselves alone to protect their interest and accomplish their goals (Scott 64) This excerpt explains the inconsistencies in the US foreign policy and its contradicting decisions to intervene in some case and not in other. For example, nearly 2 million people died in Darfur as a result of conflict between the Muslim government and rebels in the south of the country. However, the U.S. only assisted from a distance by sending $190 million in relief aid, pressing for multilateral U.N. denunciations, and sending Secretary of State Colin Powell to Darfur. The same could be said in the Rwanda genocide where Hutus killed roughly 800,000 Tutsi in a 100-day period because of a simple difference in ethnicity. The Clinton administration refrained itself from calling the incident a “genocide” because it did not want to commit any military power.
In both of these tragedies the U.S. refused direct intervention because doing so was not beneficial to our country. Dying in Darfur, an