Peter Dalton Case
Peter Dalton v. Educational Testing Service
Court of Appeals of New York
Dec. 7, 1995.
(87 N.Y.2d 384,*386, 663 N.E.2d 289,**290, 639 N.Y.S.2d 977,***977)
FACTS Brian Dalton (plaintiff) took the SAT test in May administered by Educational Testing Service (ETS) (defendant). In November, he took again and scored 410 points higher. Because the increased score fell within the ETS category of discrepant scores, the ETS did a handwriting comparison examined by a document examiner who opined that they were completed by separate individuals. The ETS made a preliminary decision to cancel Dalton’s November score. In registering for the November test, Dalton had signed an agreement granting the ETS the right to cancel any test score if ETS has reason …show more content…
First, the lower court’s factual determinations are based on an erroneous legal standard, in assuming that ETS has an implied duty to investigate Dalton’s evidence. The majority rejected that standard as well. The dissent concluded that the lower court’s decision, at minimum, should be a reversal and remittal for new findings based on the proper legal standard. Second, as a matter of law, ETS fulfilled its contractual obligation. Both the majority and dissent agree a covenant of good faith exists. The differences appear to be a result of facts, not the law. The specific factual dispute is whether ETS adequately considered Dalton’s evidence regarding his presence in the room on the test day. The dissent concluded that each ETS Board of member gave a reason why he or she found Dalton’s submission was irrelevant. Therefore, a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing could only be established if the reason the Board members gave to deem irrelevant Dalton’s submissions was arbitrary, capricious or irrational. Each Board member testified that the evidence did not explain the crucial doubt, the disparate handwriting. The reason to deem irrelevant Dalton’s evidence of presence was not irrational, arbitrary or capricious, and it cannot form the basis of a breach of the implied covenant of good faith. The majority is simply substituting its own judgment for that of
Court of Appeals of New York
Dec. 7, 1995.
(87 N.Y.2d 384,*386, 663 N.E.2d 289,**290, 639 N.Y.S.2d 977,***977)
FACTS Brian Dalton (plaintiff) took the SAT test in May administered by Educational Testing Service (ETS) (defendant). In November, he took again and scored 410 points higher. Because the increased score fell within the ETS category of discrepant scores, the ETS did a handwriting comparison examined by a document examiner who opined that they were completed by separate individuals. The ETS made a preliminary decision to cancel Dalton’s November score. In registering for the November test, Dalton had signed an agreement granting the ETS the right to cancel any test score if ETS has reason …show more content…
First, the lower court’s factual determinations are based on an erroneous legal standard, in assuming that ETS has an implied duty to investigate Dalton’s evidence. The majority rejected that standard as well. The dissent concluded that the lower court’s decision, at minimum, should be a reversal and remittal for new findings based on the proper legal standard. Second, as a matter of law, ETS fulfilled its contractual obligation. Both the majority and dissent agree a covenant of good faith exists. The differences appear to be a result of facts, not the law. The specific factual dispute is whether ETS adequately considered Dalton’s evidence regarding his presence in the room on the test day. The dissent concluded that each ETS Board of member gave a reason why he or she found Dalton’s submission was irrelevant. Therefore, a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing could only be established if the reason the Board members gave to deem irrelevant Dalton’s submissions was arbitrary, capricious or irrational. Each Board member testified that the evidence did not explain the crucial doubt, the disparate handwriting. The reason to deem irrelevant Dalton’s evidence of presence was not irrational, arbitrary or capricious, and it cannot form the basis of a breach of the implied covenant of good faith. The majority is simply substituting its own judgment for that of