Pascal's Wager: Epistemic Argument For God

Pascal’s Wager does not provide has some challenges in its reasoning and is not a convincing argument for one to believe in God, but it can be applicable to a catered category of people. Pascal’s Wagers main issue is that it is not an epistemic argument. Before just dismissing Pascal’s Wager as not an epistemic argument, one must understand what an epistemic argument is. An epistemic argument is an argument that must be rational, reasonable and justified in order to be believed. For instance, if one believes in God because one experienced a miracle and then claims the miracle experienced, like an apple falling from a tree into one’s hand is a sign from God, one’s argument pointing to the miracle as evidence is not applying an epistemic argument.
Although Linda’s argument, especially the latter half, may seem similar to my argument, Linda’s argument is not sound, but rather a weak counterargument to the objection made, because Linda makes Pascal’s Wager more of a religious recruiting tool than an actual legitimate argument by itself. The distinction between our arguments is that I argued Pascal’s Wager causes an individual to follow the religion for its benefits, temporarily becoming a selfish person before becoming a selfless individual, whereas Linda argues that the Wager itself does not create a low view of God and of religious people because the Wager is not faith in and of itself but rather the Wager is just the beginning of the path to sincere faith. Meaning, similar to the “greater good” argument about evil discussed above, I argue that Pascal’s Wager is a “greater good” argument for a necessity to temporarily be selfish until one becomes selfless, whereas Linda views the Wager more as a path for atheists or christians who are having second thoughts about believing in