Landing at Inchon: Foolish Risk or Calculated Gamble?
Landing at Inchon: Foolish Risk or Calculated Gamble?
Campaign Analysis: Operation CHROMITE
The Ultimate Challenge for the Commander is deciding on where and when to commit forces to best leverage available combat power against the opponent.
General Douglas MacArthur has been criticized for his decision, even though it succeeded, to make the invasion of Korea at the harbor of Inchon. This paper explores the legitimacy of that decision based on the principles of military power. A popular military aphorism is that victory has a thousand fathers, while defeat is an orphan. The American invasion of Inchon during the Korean War must certainly be the exception to this. General Douglas MacArthur, loved by some, hated by others, rightfully deserves all of the credit for such a bold and audacious decision. In retrospect, his decision deserves perhaps a bit more circumspection. If Inchon had failed, whether tactically or strategically, not only could the war’s outcome have been different, but most certainly MacArthur would have been lambasted in his own time, as well as our own by arm chair theorists and generals. Was his decision soundly based in military principles, balanced by ends to means? Or was it a gambler’s last toss of the dice?
America’s war aims at the onset of the Korean War were simple: Drive the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) out of South Korea, back across the 38 th parallel and re-establish peace on American terms. These were the explicit aims. The strategic priorities will sound strikingly familiar to those familiar with strategic debate in this era of Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti and Operation Desert Storm: End the war as quickly as possible and keep U.S. casualties to a minimum. Even in the 1950s, there was a political drive to keep wars short and bloodless; to attain national ends without expending resources. Perhaps the national tendency to hope to attain something for nothing is a fundamental characteristic of America.
For the North Koreans,
Campaign Analysis: Operation CHROMITE
The Ultimate Challenge for the Commander is deciding on where and when to commit forces to best leverage available combat power against the opponent.
General Douglas MacArthur has been criticized for his decision, even though it succeeded, to make the invasion of Korea at the harbor of Inchon. This paper explores the legitimacy of that decision based on the principles of military power. A popular military aphorism is that victory has a thousand fathers, while defeat is an orphan. The American invasion of Inchon during the Korean War must certainly be the exception to this. General Douglas MacArthur, loved by some, hated by others, rightfully deserves all of the credit for such a bold and audacious decision. In retrospect, his decision deserves perhaps a bit more circumspection. If Inchon had failed, whether tactically or strategically, not only could the war’s outcome have been different, but most certainly MacArthur would have been lambasted in his own time, as well as our own by arm chair theorists and generals. Was his decision soundly based in military principles, balanced by ends to means? Or was it a gambler’s last toss of the dice?
America’s war aims at the onset of the Korean War were simple: Drive the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) out of South Korea, back across the 38 th parallel and re-establish peace on American terms. These were the explicit aims. The strategic priorities will sound strikingly familiar to those familiar with strategic debate in this era of Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti and Operation Desert Storm: End the war as quickly as possible and keep U.S. casualties to a minimum. Even in the 1950s, there was a political drive to keep wars short and bloodless; to attain national ends without expending resources. Perhaps the national tendency to hope to attain something for nothing is a fundamental characteristic of America.
For the North Koreans,
Bibliography: Appleman, Roy E. South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June-November 1950). The U.S. Army in World War II. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1961. Doughty, Robert A. The Evolution of U.S. Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76. Leavenworth Papers No. 1. Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.