Kodak Case Analysis
Q2: How would you evaluate Kodak’s attempts to enter the digital business to date?
Kodak was aware of the opportunities in the digital market as early as 1980s and allocated resources into the digital business, but the inconsistency of leadership strategies and resistance at the management level made it difficult to embrace opportunities in the digital market and stood out amid rigorous competitions.
Kodak spent massive amount of research into exploring digital technologies since 1983, after Sony launched the first digital camera. The inconsistency of strategies under each CEO was detrimental for Kodak’s ability to compete in the ever changing environment of digital technology. Chandler and Whitmore realized the necessity of technological change, but were reluctant to move away from its old razor-blade strategy. There is a disconnection between invention team’s vision and senior manger’s strategy and as a result, the real potential of some excellent digital technologies was not realized. Fisher saw Kodak’s strength in imaging and electronics, and imposed his vision on making Kodak a high tech-company, which eventually backfired because of a lack of specialization. After seeing loss in hardware-based digital strategy, Carp adopted a “network and consumable”-based business model, and focused on camera, online photo manipulation and image output. To date the profitability of this strategy is uncertain while Kodak lost market share in its traditional film business as Fujifilm thrived.
It was obvious that Kodak had not made a long-term vision in the digital market nor are they efficient in organizing the new digital division. They had not made the trade off decision of which areas to specialize in, but inefficiently diluted their energy and resources in all sub-markets of digital imaging. The strategy of “do-it-all” was unsuccessful and they are yet to find a foothold in the digital market. Meanwhile, there are also corporate slacks such as the fragmented product
Kodak was aware of the opportunities in the digital market as early as 1980s and allocated resources into the digital business, but the inconsistency of leadership strategies and resistance at the management level made it difficult to embrace opportunities in the digital market and stood out amid rigorous competitions.
Kodak spent massive amount of research into exploring digital technologies since 1983, after Sony launched the first digital camera. The inconsistency of strategies under each CEO was detrimental for Kodak’s ability to compete in the ever changing environment of digital technology. Chandler and Whitmore realized the necessity of technological change, but were reluctant to move away from its old razor-blade strategy. There is a disconnection between invention team’s vision and senior manger’s strategy and as a result, the real potential of some excellent digital technologies was not realized. Fisher saw Kodak’s strength in imaging and electronics, and imposed his vision on making Kodak a high tech-company, which eventually backfired because of a lack of specialization. After seeing loss in hardware-based digital strategy, Carp adopted a “network and consumable”-based business model, and focused on camera, online photo manipulation and image output. To date the profitability of this strategy is uncertain while Kodak lost market share in its traditional film business as Fujifilm thrived.
It was obvious that Kodak had not made a long-term vision in the digital market nor are they efficient in organizing the new digital division. They had not made the trade off decision of which areas to specialize in, but inefficiently diluted their energy and resources in all sub-markets of digital imaging. The strategy of “do-it-all” was unsuccessful and they are yet to find a foothold in the digital market. Meanwhile, there are also corporate slacks such as the fragmented product
Bibliography: HBS case：Kodak